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THE INDEFINITE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF
DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDERS IS AN
APPROPRIATE LEGAL COMPROMISE
BETWEEN "MAD" AND "BAD" - A
STUDY OF MINNESOTA'S SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHIC
PERSONALITY STATUTE
KATHERINE P. BLAK-Y
I. INTRODUCTION: "MAD," "BAD," OR BOTH? - THE TENSION
BETWEEN THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SYSTEMS
In 1982, when Phillip Jay Blodgett was 16, he was adjudi-
cated a delinquent for having sexual contact with his brother.1
Seven months later he battered a social worker and was again
found delinquent. In May of 1985, Blodgett was found guilty of
violating a domestic abuse restraining order. Four months later,
three hours after his release from jail where he served time for
burglary and obstructing the legal process, Blodgett broke into
the home of the parents of his ex-girlfriend; he entered the room
where she lay sleeping and sexually assaulted her. In early 1986,
Blodgett pled guilty to these crimes, was convicted of first degree
burglary with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct, and was
sent to prison. In 1987, while enrolled in a release program
where inmates may leave the prison, but must return at night,
Blodgett sexually assaulted a woman in a supermarket parking lot
as he attempted to steal her car. When his victim resisted, he
asked, "Do you want to die?" Only five weeks later, while on
supervised release at a halfway house, Blodgett raped a 16-year-
old girl both vaginally and anally. He pled guilty to two counts of
criminal sexual conduct in the second degree and was returned
to prison in 1987. He was scheduled for release in 1991. Shortly
before his release, Blodgett was indefinitely committed to the
* BA., 1993, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate, 1996, Notre
Dame Law School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1994-96. The author thanks her
parents and Professor John H. Robinson.
1. The following facts are taken from In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 911
(Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994). In re Blodgett is the principal recent
case addressing the constitutionality of Minnesota's Psychopathic Personality
Statute, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.09-526.115 (West 1975) (repealed 1994),
under which Blodgett was civilly committed.
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Minnesota Security Hospital in St. Peter as a "psychopathic
personality."
Unfortunately, this sort of story is all too familiar. The news
is full of tragic stories in which sex offenders, like Blodgett, attack
again almost as soon as they are released from prison.2 Often,
the offender does not even complete his sentence, and he is free
on parole or some other release program. One Los Angeles
Times article describes the past of some of the individuals now
committed in Minnesota.' They include Richard Enebak, who
committed at least 37 sexual assaults in 14 years, including one
rape, where the 16-year-old girl suffered internal injuries and was
left paralyzed; David Anthony Thomas, who committed four
rapes - killing the last victim - within four weeks of being
paroled from prison, after being convicted in connection with
more than a dozen rapes; and Charles Stone, a pedophile who
has confessed to molesting as many as 200 young girls. The
relentless criminal activity of individuals like these and the legal
system's repeated failure to protect the public from them,
demands a re-evaluation of the legal system's response to persis-
tent sexual offenders.
According to received doctrine, Blodgett must be placed in
one of two legal categories: "mad" or "bad." Under the "mad"
approach, if Blodgett were determined to be mentally ill and
dangerous, the state could civilly commit him.4 Under the "bad"
2. See, e.g., Nancy Gibbs, The Devil's Disciple, TIME, Jan. 11, 1993, at 40
(discusses how self-proclaimed sexual predator Westley Allan Dodd molested
dozens of children and never served a sentence longer than four months in jail
before he was finally sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rape, and murder
of three young boys); John Leo, Dealing with Career Predators, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, April 11, 1994, at 19 (discusses how, despite his 26-year career
of sexual attacks and torture, the state of California released Warren Bland five
times before finally putting him on death row for the mutilation and murder of
a 7-year-old girl); Barry Siegel, Locking Up "Sexual Predators, "LA. TiMEs, May 10,
1990, at Al (discusses how, after serving a 13-year prison sentence for attacking
two women, Gene Raymond Kane raped and murdered a 29-year-old woman
within two months of his release, and how, after serving a ten year prison
sentence for kidnapping and assaulting two teenage girls, Earl K. Shriner, a
man with a 24-year-long history of assaults on young people, raped a 7-year-old
boy, cut off his penis, and abandoned him near death within two years of his
release).
3. Amy Kuebelbeck, Mental Wards Seen as Drastic Confinement for Repeat
Rapists, LA. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993, at Al.
4. Minnesota, for example, provides for the civil commitment of
individuals who are mentally ill and dangerous in MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253B.18-
253B.19 (West 1975). States may, without constitutional violation, civilly
commit individuals who are determined to be mentally ill and dangerous by
clear and convincing evidence. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576
(1975); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-32 (1979).
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approach, if Blodgett were convicted of a crime, the state could
imprison him. Thus, the law sets up a paradigm of extremes:
people who do terrible things to others are either sick, or evil.
The difficulty is that, in reality, mental illness and wickedness do
not exist as two opposite conditions with nothing in between.
Rather, "mad" and "bad" are the ends of a continuum upon
which moral culpability varies according to the degree of mad-
ness or badness in any one individual. Some offenders are not
easily classified as "mad" or "bad," because they are, to some
degree, a little of both, that is, they are culpable for their con-
duct to some extent, but also to some extent inculpable due to
the role that mental illness played in their conduct.
Moral culpability requires an evil mind as well as an evil act.'
This is why an individual who is truly "mad" is not morally
responsible for his conduct; he either acts pursuant to some irra-
tional delusion, is unable to possess a particular state of mind,
that is, to choose to act recklessly, knowingly or purposefully,6 or
5. Under the common law, "[c]rime . . . [was] a compound concept,
generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind... [and]
an evil-doing hand ...." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952);
WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSTIN SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAw 193 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
LAFAVE & ScoTr] ("[A] basic premise [of Anglo-American substantive criminal
law] is that conduct, to be criminal, must consist of something more than mere
action (or non-action where there is a legal duty to act); some sort of bad state
of mind is required as well."); IV WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAw OF ENGLAND 21 (1769):
[A]s a vicious will without a vicious act is no civil crime, so, on the
other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no crime at
all. So that, to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be
first, a vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act consequent upon
such vicious will.
These two elements of criminality are called mens rea (state of mind) and actus
rea (conduct). LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra, at 212 ("The basic premise that for crimi-
nal liability some mens rea is required is expressed by the Latin maxim actus non
facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is
guilty)).
6. In criminal law, three distinct states of mind may be differentiated:
"intent" (purpose), "knowledge" (conscious awareness), and "recklessness"
(conscious risk-taking). "Negligence" (should have known), too, must be
considered. See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403-7 (1980)
(distinguishing between "general intent" and "specific intent;" ".purpose,"
"knowledge," "recklessness" and "negligence;" requiring element by element
analysis; Liporata v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985) (same); United
States v. Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) (same); United States v. Freed, 401
U.S. 601, 612-14 (1971) (same) (Brennan, J., concurring); Paul Robinson &
Jane Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code
and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 681 (1983).
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lacks substantial control over his conduct.7 Criminal culpability
rightly attempts to mirror moral culpability as much as possible:
although a defendant engaged in prohibited conduct, he may
not be found guilty of a crime unless he also possessed the
required state of mind. In brief, people should be punished for
conduct only to the extent they are responsible for that conduct.
If offenders are, in some sense, both "mad" and "bad," the
law must account for the lessened culpability of those individuals.
Minnesota sought to achieve this objective by enacting its Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Statute8 that applies to individuals who
engage in criminal sexual conduct and yet are somewhere in the
middle of the continuum between "mad" and "bad." Once an
individual qualifies as a "sexual psychopathic personality" or a
"sexually dangerous person," the statute provides for civil com-
mitment as opposed to criminal confinement.
The Constitution restricts the conditions under which indi-
viduals may be civilly committed. In 1992, the United States
Supreme Court further delineated these restrictions in Foucha v.
Louisiana.9 Foucha is sometimes interpreted as requiring that all
individuals committed under legislation like Minnesota's Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Statute must be mentally ill and danger-
ous) ° Whether individuals classified as possessing sexual psycho-
pathic personalities or being a sexually dangerous person are
"mentally ill" is disputed. The dispute arises because the classifi-
cations are primarily legal, not medical. In addition, these indi-
7. See generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 320-22 (discussing
"irresistible impulse" test) and at 329-32 (discussing "substantial capacity" test of
American Law Institute).
8. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 526.09-526.115 (West 1975), repealed by 1994
Minn. Laws, 1st Sp., c.1, art. 1, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. The repealed sections
were re-enacted within the Civil Commitment Act as MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 253B.02, subd. 18a and § 253B.185 (West Supp. 1995). The re-enactment
"shall be construed as a continuation of the earlier repealed provisions.
Judicial decisions interpreting or applying the repealed sections shall continue
to apply to the same extent as if the repeal and re-enactment had not
occurred." 1994 Minn. Laws, 1st Sp., c.1, art. 1, § 6, eff. Sept. 1, 1994. Also,
additional sections, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subds. 7a and 18b (West Supp.
1995), were added when the Psychopathic Personality Statute was re-enacted as
part of the Civil Commitment Act generally. All of the sections relating to the
civil commitment of psychopathic personalities under MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 526.09-526.115 (West 1975) and of sexual psychopathic personalities or
sexually dangerous persons under MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subds. 7a, 18a
and 18b and § 253B.185 (West Supp. 1995) will hereinafter be referred to as
"Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute."
9. 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (White, J., plurality opinion).
10. See, e.g., C. Peter Erlinder, Minnesota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for
the "Politically Il1," 19 WM. MrrcHu.L L. REv. 99, 122 (1993). See generally infra
notes 216 and 222.
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viduals are often not treatable, which is a general goal of
medicine. Thus, civil commitment pursuant to Minnesota's Sex-
ual Psychopathic Personality Statute is highly controversial.
In light of this dispute, this note assesses the wisdom and
constitutionality of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute. This note argues that a person who possesses a sexual
psychopathic personality or is a sexually dangerous person under
the statute qualifies as "mentally ill" and dangerous. Accord-
ingly, this note concludes Minnesota's effort to acknowledge the
lessened culpability of such individuals while maintaining public
safety is not only constitutional, but commendable.
Part II of this note discusses the statutory requirements
under Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute and
their early construction by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and
the United States Supreme Court. Part III contrasts civil and
criminal confinement. The first two subsections discuss the
traditional rationales for confinement and the rationales behind
Minnesota's statute in light of those traditional rationales. The
next subsection addresses concerns surrounding the prediction
of dangerousness. Part III concludes by asserting that expanding
civil commitment is preferable to diverting the criminal system
from its requirement of moral blameworthiness. Part IV
addresses the constitutionality of Minnesota's statute, especially
in light of Foucha. In Part V, recommendations are made for
improving Minnesota's statute. Finally, a model statute is
proposed.
II. MINNESOTA'S CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHIC
PERSONALITIES AND SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS:
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS AND THEIR
EARLY CONSTRUCTION
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute pro-
vides for the civil commitment of dangerous individuals who are
arguably not mentally ill in a traditional medical sense, but who
nevertheless, suffer from a sexual, personality, or other mental
disorder or dysfunction that results in a pattern of harmful con-
duct. Because these individuals' misconduct may be more attrib-
utable to their disorder than to their will, the criminal system,
concerned with culpable, responsible individuals, is less suited
than the civil system to deal with them appropriately. Faced with
individuals who do not fit neatly into the categories used by
either the civil or the criminal system, Minnesota has legally
expanded its legal notion of "mental illness." Minnesota civilly
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commits, rather than criminally confines, these individuals who
are in some fundamental sense irresponsible.
To be subject to commitment under Minnesota's Sexual Psy-
chopathic Personality Statute, an individual must either possess a
"sexual psychopathic personality"'1 or be a "sexually dangerous
person."'1 2 A person who possesses a sexual psychopathic person-
ality (SPP) is a person whose emotional instability or impulsive-
ness renders that person irresponsible. This irresponsibility is
evidenced by a lack of control and a pattern of sexual miscon-
duct that results in dangerousness. A sexually dangerous person
(SDP) is a person who engages in a pattern of harmful sexual
conduct, possesses a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder
or dysfunction, and is, therefore, dangerous.
11. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a defines a "sexual psychopathic
personality" as
the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability,
or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good
judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal acts,
or a combination of any of these conditions, which render the person
irresponsible for personal conduct with respect to sexual matters, if
the person has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control the person's sexual
impulses and, as a result, is dangerous to other persons.
12. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18b defines a "sexually dangerous person" as a
person who "(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct as defined
in subdivision 7a; (2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental
disorder or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful
sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a." Id. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a) defines
"harmful sexual conduct" as "sexual conduct that creates a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or emotional harm to another." Id § 253B.02,
subd. 7a(b) states, "[tihere is a rebuttable presumption that conduct described
in the following provisions creates a substantial likelihood that a victim will
suffer serious physical or emotional harm: section 609.342 (CRIMINAL
SEXUAL CONDUCT IN THE FIRST DEGREE), 609.343 (CRIMINAL SEXUAL
CONDUCT IN THE SECOND DEGREE), 609.344 (CRIMINAL SEXUAL
CONDUCT IN THE THIRD DEGREE), or 609.345 (CRIMINAL SEXUAL
CONDUCT IN THE FOURTH DEGREE). If the conduct was motivated by the
person's sexual impulses or was part of a pattern of behavior that had criminal
sexual conduct as a goal, the presumption also applies to conduct described in
section 609.185 (MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE), 609.19 (MURDER IN
THE SECOND DEGREE), 609.195 (MURDER IN THE THIRD DEGREE),
609.20 (MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE), 609.205
(MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE), 609.221 (ASSAULT IN THE
FIRST DEGREE), 609.222 (ASSAULT IN THE SECOND DEGREE), 609.223
(ASSAULT IN THE THIRD DEGREE), 609.24 (SIMPLE ROBBERY), 609.245
(AGGRAVATED ROBBERY), 609.25 (KIDNAPPING), 609.255 (FALSE
IMPRISONMENT), 609.365 (INCEST), 609.498 (TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS), 609.561 (ARSON IN THE FIRST DEGREE), 609.582, subdivision 1
(BURGLARY IN THE FIRST DEGREE), 609.713 (TERRORISTIC THREATS),
or 609.749, subdivisions 3 or 5 (HARASSMENT AND STALKING)."
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Minnesota's Civil Commitment Act of 1982, in which these
conditions are defined, provides the procedure for all civil com-
mitment in Minnesota. The procedures apply to the commit-
ment of the mentally retarded, the chemically dependent, the
mentally ill and the mentally ill and dangerous to the public."3
Other than the method of initiating the proceedings and of
transfer, the commitment procedure for a person who possesses
a SPP or is a SDP is identical to the procedure used to commit
someone who is mentally ill and dangerous to the public.14
Before commitment proceedings may begin, the Sexual Psy-
chopathic Personality Statute first requires that facts supporting
commitment be submitted to the county attorney, who, if satis-
fied that good cause exists, will prepare a petition to be executed
by a person having knowledge of the facts and filed with the com-
mitting court of the county in which the proposed subject for
commitment is present.1" If the proposed subject of commit-
ment is in the custody of the commissioner of corrections, the
petition may be filed in the county where the conviction for
which the subject is incarcerated was entered. 6
As in all other judicial commitments, the petition must con-
tain detailed factual descriptions of the subject's recent behavior
and all factual allegations must be supported by the observations
of witnesses named in the petition. The statements must be
made in behavioral terms and "judgmental or conclusory state-
ments" are specifically forbidden. 8 The petition must also be
accompanied by the written statement of an examiner stating
that he or she has examined the subject and is of the opinion
that the subject is suffering from a designated disability and rec-
ommends commitment.19
After receiving the filed petition, the court hears the peti-
tion according to the procedures set out for the commitment of
13. See id. §§ 253B.01-253B.23.
14. Id. § 253B.18.
15. Id. § 253B.185, subd. 1. The statute also allows for the creation by the
Supreme Court of Minnesota of a statewide judicial panel that would be
authorized to preside over the commitment of any person who possesses a SPP
or is a SDP. In the event this panel is created, all petitions for civil commitment
pursuant to the Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute would be. filed with the
Minnesota Supreme Court rather than with the district court in the county
where the subject of commitment is present. The procedures would otherwise
remain the same. Id. § 253B.185, subd. 4(b).
16. Id. § 253B.185, subd. 1.
17. Id. § 253B.07, subd. 2.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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those who are mentally ill and dangerous. 2° The hearing must
be held in a timely fashion2 ' and notice must be given to all the
interested parties.22 The subject has the right to attend and tes-
tify,23 as well as present and cross-examine witnesses through his
attorney. 24 All relevant evidence must be admitted25 and an ade-
quate record must be made and preserved.26
The subject enjoys other procedural rights, including access
to all medical records relevant to commitment,27 representation
by counsel at any proceeding, the appointment of counsel if not
otherwise retained, 8 and written notification of all rights.29
If the court finds that the subject possesses a SPP or is a SDP,
it must commit the subject to the Minnesota Security Hospital or
other designated treatment facility. The burden of proof is upon
20. Id. § 253B.185 provides,-"[u]pon the filing of a petition alleging that
a proposed patient is a sexually dangerous person or is a person with a sexual
psychopathic personality, the court shall hear the petition as provided in
section 253B.18." Id. § 253B.18, subd. 1 states, "the court shall hear the petition
as provided in sections 253B.07 and 253B.08" which provide for the civil
commitment of patients generally.
21. Id. § 253B.08, subd. 1, in relevant part, provides,
[t]he hearing on the commitment petition shall be held within 14
days from the date of the filing of the petition. For good cause shown,
the court may extend the time of the hearing up to an additional 30
days. When any proposed patient has not had a hearing on a petition
filed... the proceedings shall be dismissed.
In addition, the proposed patient or the head of the treatment facility in which
the person is held may demand in writing that the hearing be held immedi-
ately. Id.
22. Id. § 253B.08, subd. 2, in relevant part, provides, "[t]he proposed
patient, patient's counsel, the petitioner, and any other persons the court
directs shall be given at least five days' notice that a hearing will be held and at
least two days' notice of the time and date of the hearing, except that any
person may waive notice."
23. Id. § 253B.08, subd. 3, in relevant part, provides, "[a]ll persons to
whom notice has been given may attend the hearing and, except for the
proposed patient's counsel, may testify."
24. Id. § 253B.08, subd. 4.
25. Id. § 253B.08, subd. 7.
26. Id. § 253B.08, subd. 8.
27. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 8.
28. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 9 provides, "[c]ounsel shall have the full right of
subpoena. In all proceedings... counsel shall: (1) consult with the person
prior to any hearing; (2) be given adequate time to prepare for all hearings; (3)
continue to represent the person throughout any proceedings. . . unless
released as counsel by the court; and (4) be a vigorous advocate on behalf of
the client."
29. Id. § 253B.03, subd. 10.
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the state to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that
the subject possesses a SPP or is a SDP."°
While at the commitment facility, subject to safety concerns
and other reasonable regulations, the subject enjoys the follow-
ing rights: to be free from restraints; to correspond freely without
censorship; to receive phone calls and visitors, including visits
from personal physicians, spiritual advisors, and counsel at all
reasonable times; to receive periodic medical assessment; to be
free from all medical procedures and treatments without prior
consent; and to receive proper care and treatment in the form of
an individualized written program plan.3 '
After the initial commitment, a written treatment report
must be filed with the committing court within 60 days.3 2
Another hearing is then held prior to making a final commit-
ment determination.33 If, at this hearing, the court finds the sub-
ject continues to possess a SPP or be a SDP, the court will commit
the subject for an indeterminate period of time.3 4
Subsequent to a final determination that the subject possess
a SPP or is a SDP, all petitions for transfer and all petitions rela-
tive to discharge, provisional discharge, and revocation of provi-
sional discharge, are heard by a special review board established
to hear petitions regarding those committed as mentally ill and
dangerous.33 A person committed for having a SPP or being a
SDP may not be placed on release on pass-eligible status unless
that status is approved by the medical director of the Minnesota
Security Hospital.36
30. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 1; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn.),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994).
31. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03.
32. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 2.
33. Id. The hearing must be held within 14 days of court's receipt of the
treatment report or within 90 days of initial commitment or admission,
whichever is earlier. Automatic discharge, however, is unavailable. Id.
34. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 3.
35. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 4. The statute also provides that the "board shall
consist of three members experienced in the field of mental illness. One
member of the special review board shall be a physician and one shall be an
attorney. No member shall be affiliated with the department of human
services. The special review board shall meet at least every six months and at
the call of the commissioner." Id.
36. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 4b.
At least ten days prior to [determining whether to grant pass-eligible
status], the medical director shall notify the committing court, the
county attorney of the county of commitment, the designated agency,
any interested persons, the petitioner, and the petitioner's counsel of
the proposed status, and their right to request review by the special
review board. If within ten days of receiving notice any notified
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The subject or the head of the treatment facility may also file
a petition for an order of transfer, discharge, provisional dis-
charge, or revocation of provisional discharge upon which a
hearing will be held.37 A subject committed as possessing a SPP
or being a SDP, however, may not be transferred out of the Min-
nesota Security Hospital unless the commissioner, after a hearing
and favorable recommendation by a majority of the special
review board, determines transfer to be appropriate.3' Detailed
procedures for provisional discharge are specified, including
consideration of specific factors.39 Similar procedures exist for
discharge that may be granted if the subject is capable of making
an acceptable adjustment to open society, is no longer dangerous
to the public, and is no longer in need of inpatient treatment
and supervision.' Finally, the subject or the county attorney
may petition an appeal panel for a rehearing and reconsidera-
tion of a decision by the commissioner.4 1 After notice is pro-
vided to interested parties, a hearing on the petition is held at
which procedural protection including the right to cross-
person requests review... a hearing shall be held before the special
review board. The proposed status shall not be implemented unless it
receives a favorable recommendation by a majority of the board and
approval by the commissioner. The order of the commissioner is
appealable [to a judicial panel] as provided in section 253B.19.
Id
37. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 5.
38. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 6. The transfer may be to other regional centers
under the commissioner's control. Id. If the subject is later committed to the
custody of the commissioner of corrections, the subject may be transferred
from a hospital to another facility designated by the commissioner of
corrections. The following factors are considered in determining whether a
transfer is appropriate: (1) the person's unamenability to treatment; (2) the
person's unwillingness or failure to follow treatment recommendations; (3) the
person's lack of progress in treatment at the public or private hospital; (4) the
danger posed by the person to other patients or staff at the public or private
hospital; and (5) the degree of security necessary to protect the public. Id.
§ 253B.185, subd. 2.
39. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 7. Provisional discharge will not be granted
unless the subject is found capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open
society. In making their determination, the review board and the
commissioner consider (a) whether the patient's course of hospitalization and
present medical status indicate there is no longer a need for inpatient
treatment and supervision; and (b) whether the conditions of the provisional
discharge plan will provide a reasonable degree of protection to the public and
will enable the patient to adjust to the community. Id. Provisional discharge is
subject to review, id. § 253B.18, subd. 9, and may be revoked, id. § 253B.18,
subd. 10. Revocation is also subject to appeal. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 13.
40. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 15.
41. Id. § 253B.19, subd. 2.
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examine all witnesses is provided. 2 The petitioning party bears
the burden of going forward with the evidence, and the party
opposing discharge bears the burden of proof by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the respondent is in need of commit-
ment.43 A majority of the appeal panel rules upon the petition
and their decision may be appealed to the court of appeals as in
other civil cases.'
The Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute provides a
method of civil commitment and is, thus, not part of Minnesota's
criminal code. Accordingly, the statute states,
[t]he existence in any person of a condition of a sexual
psychopathic personality or the fact that a person is a sexu-
ally dangerous person shall not in any case constitute a
defense to a charge of crime, nor relieve such person from
liability to be tried upon a criminal charge.45
The statute also provides that any criminal sentence imposed on
the subject, prior to commitment for possessing a SPP or being a
SDP, will be served first and followed by transfer to a regional
center designated by the commissioner of human services.1
The constitutionality of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute in its previous form47 was challenged in 1939
in State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court.4" In Pearson, the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague under the fourteenth amendment; it did not, therefore,
violate due process.4 9 Applying the usual principles of legislative
construction, including deference to the legislature and a pre-
sumption of constitutionality, the court held the act was
intended to include those persons who, by a habitual
course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an
utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and
who, as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict
injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire.5 °
Through this judicial construction, the holding of Pearson
became the three-part test that the state must meet in order to
42. Id.
43. Id. § 253B.19, subd. 2; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994).
44. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.19, subds. 3 and 5.
45. Id. § 253B.185, subd. 3.
46. Id. § 253B.185, subd. 2(b).
47. Id. §§ 526.09-526.115 (repealed 1994).
48. 287 N.W. 297 (Minn. 1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
49. Pearson, 287 N.W. at 302.
50. Id.
238 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
demonstrate someone was a "psychopathic personality." The
state must show (1) habitual misconduct in sexual matters, (2)
an utter lack of power to control sexual impulses, and (3) a likeli-
hood that this lack of control will result in injury to others.
These elements are now expressly included in the text of the re-
enacted statute.51 The Pearson court also emphasized the limited
application of the statute: "It would not be reasonable to apply
the provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual mis-
conduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensi-
ties."52 Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court narrowly construed
the statute, imposed on it the three-part test and rejected the
allegation that the statute was vague and overly broad.
Significantly, the Pearson court discussed the reasoning
behind the classification "psychopathic personality" and its rela-
tion to mental illness or insanity. The court first emphasized that
under the statute.all laws relating to mentally ill persons who are
dangerous to the public also apply to persons with psychopathic
personalities.53  This approach is appropriate, the court
explained, because the psychopathic personality statute legally
"extends the concept of insanity to include sexually irresponsible
persons who are dangerous to others. " ' Nevertheless, unlike
being medically insane, possessing a SPP (or being a SDP under
the re-enacted act) does not constitute a defense to a criminal
charge.55
At first, this exclusion may appear contradictory. If the legis-
lature extended the notion of legal insanity when it created the
categories "sexual psychopathic personality" and "sexually dan-
gerous person," then, like being insane, why should these catego-
ries not constitute a defense to criminal conduct as well as a basis
for civil commitment? The word "expand," as used by the Pearson
court, should not be misread. The Pearson court did not mean
that the Minnesota legislature generally expanded the definition
of "legal insanity." No general legal definition of insanity exists
in Minnesota jurisprudence. Rather, the definition of "insanity"
or "mental illness" is context-specific, as are its legal conse-
quences.5 6 In fact, Minnesota jurisprudence contains one defini-
51. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a.
52. Pearson, 287 N.W. at 302.
53. Id. at 298.
54. Id. at 303.
55. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.185, subd. 3.
56. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHENJ. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 929 (6th ed. 1995):
Insanity can become an important legal issue in a variety of
circumstances. A contract may be unenforceable if one of the parties
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tion of insanity in the criminal context, but another
complementary definition in the civil context. The Pearson court
explained,
[o]n its surface [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 526.11] would appear
to imply that persons with psychopathic personalities are
sane. The confusion which is thus caused is obviated when
we consider the limited scope of the term 'insanity' when
used to indicate a defense to crime. In [Minnesota], an
uncontrollable and insane impulse to commit crime, in the
mind of one who is conscious of the nature and quality of
the act, is not allowed to relieve a person of criminal
liability.
5 7
In other words, Minnesota employs the M'Naghten5 8 test for
criminal insanity - a lack of appreciation for the nature and
quality of an act as right or wrong - and rejects the "irresistible
impulse" test. A legislature is, of course, constitutionally entitled
to make this choice. As the United States Supreme Court held in
Leland v. Oregon, the "choice of a test of legal sanity involves not
only scientific knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the
extent to which that knowledge [of right and wrong] should
was insane when the contract was made. A will may be held void if the
testator was insane. In the criminal process, insanity can be relevant at
different stages. Of greatest importance to the substantive criminal
law, insanity at the time of the offense is usually a defense to a criminal
charge. In addition, a person who is insane may not be tried,
convicted, or sentenced. Neither may such a person be executed if
convicted of a capital offense. Further, under many state statutes, a
person who becomes insane while in prison must be transferred to a
mental hospital.
The legal definition of insanity varies from context to context. See, e.g., Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (requiring a defendant to have "suffi-
cient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding - and ... a rational as well as factual understanding of
the proceedings against him" to stand trial); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
422 (1986) (stating execution consistent with the Eighth Amendment requires
that defendants, at minimum, "know the fact of their impending execution and
the reason for it.") (Powell,J., concurring); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 333
(1989) (Powell's concurring text assumed, refusing to adopt a general rule that
mentally retarded individuals can never possess the level of moral culpability
that would justify a capital sentence and upholding death sentence of mentally
retarded petitioner despite evidence that he possessed a mental age of seven).
See generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, 302-403; ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN,
Excuse: Insanity in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIME ANDJUSTICE 735-41 (1983) [herein-
after ENCYCLOPEDIA].
57. Pearson, 287 N.W. at 303.
58. This test is named for the English decision in which it was formulated,
M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200 (H.L., 1843).
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determine criminal responsibility."59 In Leland, the Supreme
Court upheld an Oregon statute that adopted the traditional
M'Naghten "right and wrong" test, but did not recognize the more
modem "irresistible impulse" test; that choice, the Court found,
did not offend any concept of ordered liberty and did not violate
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
60
Because Minnesota does not adopt the "irresistible impulse"
definition of criminal insanity, possessing a SPP or being a SDP
does not by itself imply sanity or constitute a defense to a crimi-
nal charge. Minnesota's legislature recognizes the potential for
lessened culpability when someone experiences an "irresistible
impulse" or a similar lack of self-control. Instead of extending its
definition of criminal insanity, it extended its notion of civil
insanity. The Pearson court rightly continued,
[t]he act before us, in providing for the care and commit-
ment of persons having uncontrollable and insane
impulses to commit sexual offenses, treats them as insane.
While the public welfare requires that they be treated
before they have an opportunity to injure others, it does
not necessarily follow that their malady must excuse them
from criminal conduct occurring in the past.
6 1
Thus, Minnesota acknowledged the tension between "mad" and
"bad" and responded to a potentially unworkable either/or para-
digm with a creative solution.
One year later, Pearson was unanimously affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate
Court of Ramsey County."2 The Minnesota Supreme Court's con-
struction of the statute was, of course, binding on the Court.63
Accordingly, Chief Justice Hughes wrote, "[t]his construction of
the statute destroys the contention that it is too vague and indefi-
nite to constitute valid legislation."' In fact, Justice Hughes con-
tinued, the three elements from the Pearson test "are as
susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly applied in
prosecutions for crime. "6 Thus, the Court held that Minnesota's
59. 343 U.S. 790, 800 (1952).
60. Id. at 800.
61. Pearson, 287 N.W. at 303.
62. 309 U.S. 270 (1939).
63. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983) ("In evaluating a facial
challenge to a state law, a federal court must, of course, consider any limiting
construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.") (quoting
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5
(1982)).
64. 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1939).
65. Id.
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Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, at least in its original
form, did not on its face violate substantive due process.66
The Court also found that the statute did not violate proce-
dural due process. After rehearsing the detailed and extensive
procedural protection provided by the statute, the Court
recognized
the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings
dealing with persons charged with insanity or, as here, with
a psychopathic personality ... and the special importance
of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a class of
cases where the law though 'fair on its face and impartial in
appearance' may be open to serious abuses in
administration.67
Yet, the Court stated, "we have no occasion to consider such
abuses here, for none have occurred. The applicable statutes are
not patently defective in any vital respect. "68
Finally, the Court concluded the statute did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
provision ordinarily requires only that a legislature have a reason-
able basis for selecting a class of people that a statute affects. The
Court saw
no reason for doubt upon this point .... [w]hether the
legislature could have gone farther is not the question.
The class [the legislature] did select is identified by the
state court in terms which clearly show that the persons
within that class constitute a dangerous element in the
community which the legislature in its discretion could put
under appropriate control. As we have often said, the leg-
islature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may
confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be the clearest.
69
In the fifty-five years after the Supreme Court decided Pear-
son, the Court issued a number of opinions dealing with the con-
stitutional issues surrounding civil commitment.70 In light of
these cases, Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute
66. Id.
67. Id. at 276-77.
68. Id. at 277.
69. Id. at 274-75.
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979);
Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980);Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983);
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
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came under new constitutional attack. In re Blodgett71 is the pri-
mary Minnesota case upholding the constitutionality of the Sex-
ual Psychopathic Personality Statute. 72 The statute's 1994 repeal,
re-enactment, and amendment, however, will likely fuel further
debate - whether justified by the additions to the statute or not.
This note argues that the current draft of Minnesota's Sexual Psy-
chopathic Personality Statute remains constitutional, even in
light of the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence on civil com-
mitment. While not all the additions to the statute are wise, the
statute should be upheld.
III. CIVIL VS. CRIMINAL CONFINEMENT
Minnesota passed its Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute
to deal with offenders who are, to some degree, both "mad" and
"bad." Rather than evaluating the statute in light of the contrast
between the civil and criminal systems that gives rise to the "mad"
or "bad" paradigm, this note evaluates the statute in light of the
general rationales for confinement. Deconstructing the civil-
criminal distinction demonstrates the potential for a new solu-
tion free from the "mad" or "bad" paradigm, particularly to the
extent that the old paradigm does not reflect reality or achieve
sound social goals. Although the basic distinction between con-
finement in the civil system and confinement in the criminal sys-
tem is generally workable, the reality manifested by the existence
of these types of sex offenders is not captured by the legal catego-
ries created under the two systems. Unthinkingly repeating the
traditional boundaries of these categories is unproductive. Re-
examining their practical implications is necessary. The catego-
ries were created to achieve specific purposes. They must be
examined in light of those purposes. The boundaries of our
legal categories are not fixed, but malleable in light of our goals.
Confinement in any context is appropriate or inappropriate in
light of its purposes, not in light of the labels pinned on it. With
this in mind, Minnesota's decision to expand civil commitment
rather than to divert the criminal system from its fundamental
requirement of moral blameworthiness is best evaluated as a
commendable attempt to address the danger posed by a set of
uniquely disturbed individuals.
71. 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994).
72. Id. at 916-17.
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A. A Distinction Rooted More in Purpose than Reality
The civil-criminal distinction is, in some sense, artificial;
whatever it is, it is an artifact made by law not found in nature.7 3
The distinction is rooted more in purpose than reality. In fact,
early law was originally concerned primarily about maintaining
peace and long predates the distinction."4 As the purposes of law
became more sophisticated and diverse, the civil-criminal distinc-
tion arose in order to delineate and implement those purposes
more effectively.75
The civil and criminal law systems, therefore, differ not so
much in the conduct they regulate, but in their purposes.76 For
example, A hits B with his car and kills him. The same conduct
may give rise to a civil suit for wrongful death resulting in mone-
tary damages or a criminal prosecution for reckless homicide
resulting in a prison sentence, or both. In this example, the prin-
cipal purpose of the civil system is to compensate, while the prin-
cipal purpose of the criminal system is to punish. Apart from the
purpose the community is pursuing, nothing about A's conduct
itself demands a certain form of response by the community.
In the above example, the civil and criminal systems substan-
tially overlap because the same conduct gives rise to both civil
and criminal consequences, each system pursuing related, but
73. See generally Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies
to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-
Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTING LJ. 1325 (1991); Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil
Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE LJ. 1795
(1992). Constitutional analysis properly follows substance, not label. See, e.g.,
Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988) (stating the criminal or civil label
affixed to a contempt proceeding under state law was not controlling for
federal constitutional purposes).
74. See Max Radin, Criminal Intent, VIII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 126 (1944). Radin observes:
[H]istorically, the necessity for the existence of any mental element is
the late requirement. The right of satisfaction recognized by early law
is an undifferentiated claim which may in modern terminology be
based on tort, crime or breach of contract.... Since the right ... is a
right to reparation, the question of the wrongdoer's intent is
irrelevant.
Id. at 128.
75. See generally MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN, REASON AND THE LAw 27-72
(1961); CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT: VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS, AND JUSTIFICATIONS
(Rudolph J. Gerber & Patrick D. McAnany eds., 1972) (hereinafter GERBER &
McANANY); Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 56, at 1336;
LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at 22-29 (outlining theories of punishment and
the conflicts between them); FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY (Herbert Morris, ed.,
1961); EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, THE RATIONALE OF LEGAL PUNISHMENT (1966).
76. See generally LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 5, at 12-16 (outlining theories
of crime and tort and the interaction of criminal and civil law).
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distinct purposes. The purposes pursued by each system may,
however, also overlap. For example, the civil system, which usu-
ally seeks to compensate victims, often provides for punitive dam-
ages and certain types of forfeitures, that act to sanction the
wrongdoer.77 Even the criminal system, which primarily seeks to
punish the blameworthy, provides for certain kinds of strict liabil-
ity for regulatory crimes where the defendant must pay a fine or
even go to jail despite his lack of personal culpability; the sanc-
tions at least may be seen as compensating the community.78
Based on the historical origins of the two systems and the overlap
between them, it can hardly be persuasively argued that a civil or
criminal label is somehow essential to a law's legitimacy.79
Rather, the purpose a law is trying to achieve is the central factor
to evaluate.
B. The Traditional Rationales for Confinement
Confinement, itself, is common to both the civil and crimi-
nal systems. Confinement is, in principle, acceptable because it
can be used to pursue any number of purposes. The civil system,
although it sometimes pursues punishment as a goal, does not
employ confinement to punish. Deprivation of liberty as a pun-
ishment is considered too serious a sanction to be administered
apart from a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.80
77. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Industries of Vt. Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,
492 U.S. 257 (1989) (holding the excessive fines clause of the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to punitive damage award in civil suit); United
States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984) (holding prior
acquittal of criminal firearms charge does not bar subsequent civil forfeiture of
firearms under double jeopardy clause or collateral estoppel).
78. Compare United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975) (holding president
of food chain strictly and vicariously criminally liable for storage of adulterated
food) with United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-51 (1980) (upholding
imposition of civil penalty for oil spill, even though conduct separately
criminal). The "regulatory" offense category is not closed-ended. See
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260, 262 n.20 (1952) ("We attempt no
closed definitions [of regulatory crimes], for the law on the subject is neither
settled nor static.") (citing Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L.
REv. 57, 73, 84 (1933) (examples of offense categories include: liquor,
adulterated food or drugs, misbranded articles, anti-narcotics, criminal
nuisances, traffic regulations, motor vehicle laws, and police regulations)). The
Supreme Court's most recent view of regulatory crimes is reflected in Staples v.
United States, 114 S.Ct. 1793 (1994) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew that the weapon he possessed was capable of
firing as a machine gun to convict for possession of an unregistered machine
gun). See also generally Phillip E. Johnson, Strict Liability: The Prevalent View,
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 56, at 1518.
79. See supra note 73.
80. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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Rather, confinement in the civil system is reserved to those who
are in need of care and treatment and who pose some danger to
themselves or others.81 The traditional goals of civil confine-
ment are treatment and prevention of harm to the person con-
fined or to the public.82
In the criminal system, confinement is used primarily to
punish individuals found guilty of crimes. It is also, however,
used to prevent harm before guilt has been determined in lim-
ited circumstances.8" The traditional goals of criminal confine-
ment are retribution and prevention of harm through
deterrence and incapacitation.84 While punitive confinement
may also provide an opportunity for some treatment, rehabilita-
tion alone is not reason enough to support a prison sentence,85
and it is not a primary goal of the criminal system.
Thus, the traditional purposes pursued in each system
formed the foundation for the paradigm that classifies individu-
als as either "mad" or "bad." Although the rationales behind
confinement are often discussed thematically as either civil or
criminal, for the purposes of this note, the rationales are best
considered apart from the usual labels.
The four primary rationales for confinement in our legal sys-
tem are retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacita-
tion. 86  Essentially, each rationale states a purpose of
confinement as it relates to the individual and society. In brief, a
certain purpose and sort of individual is presupposed by each
81. In the rather unique context of civil contempt, confinement in the
civil system may also be used to coerce.
82. See, e.g., LINDSAY G. ARTHUR ET. AL., INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
- A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES, 3 (Jeanne A. Dooley & John W. Parry
eds., 1988) (stating "[tihe principal purpose of civil commitment is treatment
and protective isolation of the individual"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
426 (1979) (stating "[t]he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae
powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police
power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who
are mentally ill").
83. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748, 751-52 (1987)
(holding that the Constitution did not prohibit the pretrial detention of an
arrestee imposed as a regulatory measure on the ground of community danger
pursuant to the Bail Reform Act, when Government proved by clear and
convincing evidence that arrestee presented identifiable and articulable threat
to an individual or the community).
84. See supra note 75.
85. In fact, rehabilitation alone is not even reason enough to support
involuntary civil commitment of a person who is mentally ill, but harmless.
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
86. See supra note 75.
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rationale: to punish the culpable, to deter the rational, to cure
the sick, and to disable the dangerous. In each case, the key to
determining whether pursuing a particular purpose or purposes
is appropriate in a particular situation is not whether the situa-
tion is similar to what has been traditionally considered civil or
criminal. Rather, evaluation should focus on whether the char-
acteristics and activity of the individual to be confined, the situa-
tion out of which the need for confinement arises, and the
conditions of confinement and release are consistent with the
asserted rationale's purpose and presuppositions.
1. Retribution
Retribution means "repayment, recompense." 87 Yet, unlike
personal restitution to an individual victim, retribution as a
rationale for confinement refers to the wrongdoer repaying his
"debt to society" by enduring punishment for his wrongdoing.
The rationale presupposes a rational individual whose deliberate
acts are evaluated as right or wrong.88 When a person does
wrong, that is, causes or threatens harm with sufficient state of
mind to do so, he asserts a power that places himself above every
other individual in the community."' This assertion of power is
87. 13 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 793 (2d ed. 1989).
88. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 126 (1930)
(stating "the starting point of the criminal law... [in] the [19th] century...
[was] that a criminal was a person possessed of free will who, having before him
a choice between right and wrong... freely and deliberately chose ... to do
wrong....").
89. See generally Pope Pius XII, Crime and Punishment, in GERBER AND
McANAN, supra note 75, at 59.
The criminal act... is ... an opposition of one person against another
.... Considered in the object affected by it, the criminal action is an
arrogant contempt for authority, which demands the orderly
maintenance of what is right and good, and which is the source, the
guardian, the defender and the vindication of order itself. ... The
object affected by this act is also the legally established community, if
and in as far as it places in danger and violates the order established by
the laws .... The punishment is the reaction, required by law and
justice, to the crime .. .. The order violated by the criminal act
demands the restoration and re-establishment of the equilibrium
which has been disturbed. It is the proper task of law and justice to
guard and preserve the harmony between duty, on the one hand, and
the law, on the other, and to re-establish this harmony if it has been
injured.
Id. at 59-61. See also IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie trans.,
1887).
But what is the mode and measure of Punishment which Public Justice
takes as its Principle and Standard? It is just the Principle of Equality,
by which the pointer of the Scale ofJustice is made to incline no more
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wrong because all individuals are equal and each possesses a
moral and legal right not to be reduced to a mere means for
another's gratification.9" Through his self-preference, the
wrongdoer upsets the order of the community.9' In order to
restore moral and legal order, representatives of the community
as a whole judge the individual accused of wrongdoing and, if he
is found guilty, they punish him.9" By asserting authority over
the individual through adjudication and punishment, the com-
munity counters the threat to the community and vindicates the
individual victim, albeit vicariously.
Thus, punishment is inflicted upon an individual not simply
because he has caused harm, but because he culpably willed the
harm, and thereby asserted an unjustifiable right to harm. The
assertion of an illegitimate right to harm, not simply the harm
itself, upsets moral order reflected in the law. Punishment is,
therefore, reserved for those who are morally responsible. Moral
responsibility requires a guilty hand and a guilty mind9" - that
is, an assertion of an illegitimate right to harm equals through
action.94
2. Deterrence
The deterrence rationale for confinement is related to retri-
bution and, as such, is often joined with retribution as an appro-
priate community response to individuals who cause harm. The
deterrence rationale focuses more on the individual than on the
to the one side than the other. It may be rendered by saying that the
undeserved evil which anyone commits on another, is to be regarded
as perpetrated on himself. Hence it may be said: 'If you slander
another, you slander yourself; if you steal from another, you steal from
yourself .... This is the Right of Retaliation .... [W]hoever steals
anything makes the property of all insecure; he therefore robs himself
of all security in property, according to the Right of Retaliation. Such
a one has nothing, and can acquire nothing ....
Id. at 196-97.
90. See supra note 89.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 5.
94. See supra note 89. See also 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HIsTORY OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81-82 (1883).
[T]he sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in
relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax.... [T] he infliction of
punishment by law gives definite expression and a solemn ratification
and justification to the hatred which is excited by the commission of
the offence, and which constitutes the moral or popular as
distinguished from the conscientious sanction of that part of morality
which is also sanctioned by the criminal law.
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harm. People are presumed to be rational individuals who delib-
erately choose to act as they do, either causing harm or not caus-
ing harm. Based on the presumption of rationality, deterrence is
the use of punishment as a disincentive.9" If a rational individual
knows that punishment is the sufficiently swift, sure, and severe
result of defined wrongdoing, then that individual is likely to
avoid wrongdoing.
Deterrence may be either specific or general.96 That is, pun-
ishment of a particular individual may not only deter that indi-
vidual from future conduct - specific deterrence - but may
also deter others who are aware of the punishment - general
deterrence. The imposition of punishment in order to achieve
both specific and general deterrence requires rational actors and
relatively proportional punishment. Otherwise, the link between
choice and punishment is arbitrary.97 If the link is arbitrary, the
95. The classic statement of the deterrence rationale is Jeremy Bentham,
Principle of Penal Law, Part II Book 1 ch. 3 in 1 WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM 396-
402 (Bowring ed. 1843). See generally Johannes Andenaes, Deterrence,
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 56, at 591; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS,
DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
96. Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U.
PA. L. REv. 949, 965-70 (1966).
97. Herbert L. Packer, The Practical Limits of Deterrence, GERBER &
MCANANY, supra note 75.
People ought in general to be able to plan their conduct with some
assurance that they can avoid entanglement with the criminal law ....
It is precisely the fact that in its normal and characteristic operation
the criminal law provides this opportunity and this protection to
people in their everyday lives that makes it a tolerable institution in a
free society. Take [culpability] away, and the criminal law ceases to be
a guide to the well-intentioned and a restriction on the restraining
power of the state.
Id at 106. See also Paul H. Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and
Dangerous Blameless Offenders, 83J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1993). Profes-
sor Robinson argues:
[T]here is disutility in a criminal justice system that imposes punish-
ment that is not seen as deserved.... Moral condemnation is an inex-
pensive yet powerful form of deterrent threat .... This marvelously
cost-efficient sanction is available, however, only if the system retains
its moral credibility. If the system is seen to convict where no commu-
nity condemnation is appropriate, the condemnation of criminal con-
viction is weakened. . . . [S]tudies suggest that most persons are
motivated to obey the law, not because they fear being caught and
punished (or shamed), but because they believe in the moral weight
of the law .... because they want to do what is right .... But the
effectiveness of the law in gaining compliance in this way is again a
function of the law's credibility for doing justice. If the law matches
closely people's shared intuitive notions ofjustice, it grows in its power
to act as a model for their conduct. If the law is seen as being unjust,
its power as a moral force is diminished.
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system will be recognized as unjust due to the lack of culpability
and people will be unable, or unwilling, to conform their con-
duct in light of probable consequences.9"
3. Rehabilitation
Unlike retribution and deterrence, the rehabilitative ration-
ale does not presuppose a rational individual who makes deliber-
ate, meaningful choices.99 Instead, this rationale presupposes an
individual who is, in some sense "sick," that is, lacking in the abil-
ities required to function and succeed in society. The "sickness"
may be a mental, physical, emotional or psychological ailment or
disability. Some even argue the crime-causing disability may be a
socio-economic disadvantage such as poverty.1"' Criminal or
otherwise undesired behavior is considered the result of this sick-
ness. Future wrongful conduct is not avoided through penalty or
stigma, but by treating the disability that causes it and rehabilitat-
ing the person.
While rehabilitation does not always require confinement, it
often does because the malady is serious enough to make the
person a danger to himself or others or because the person's
environment is thought to have played a causal role in his misbe-
havior. The form of treatment may also require confinement
and extensive supervision for its effective administration. When
Id. at 707-08. Montesquieu observes: "Liberty is in perfection when criminal
laws derive each punishment from the particular nature of the crime. There
are then no arbitrary decisions; the punishment does not flow from the capri-
ciousness of the legislator, but from the very nature of the thing .. " BARON DE
MONTrESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 185 (T. Nugent, trans. 1949).
98. See supra note 97.
99. See generally Francis A. Allen, The Rehabilitative Ideal, GERBER &
MCANANY, supra note 75, 209-18; MICHAEL MOORE, LAW & PSYCHIATRY 234-35
(1984); Richard D. Schwartz, Rehabilitation, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 56, at
1364. Compare Morris R. Cohen, Moral Aspects of the Criminal Law, 49 YALE L.J.
987, 1012-14 (1940) ("There are . . . a number of highly questionable
assumptions [behind the reform] theory..." including that crime is the result
of physical or mental disease, that crime is curable, that crime is curable at a
reasonable cost, and that reform is an individual rather than a group matter.)
with Robert Martinson, What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform,
6 PuB. INTEREsT 22, 25 (1974) ("With few and isolated exceptions, the
rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have no appreciable effect
on recidivism.") and Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TULANE L.
REv. 1011, 1037 (1991) ("More sophisticated research techniques demonstrate
that some offenders are amenable to rehabilitation ...").
100. See, e.g., Jeffrie Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
217 (1973) (principally relying on WILLEM BONGER, CRiMINALrry AND ECONOMIC
CONDITIONS (1916), a sustained Marxist analysis of crime and punishment);
Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background": Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 L. & INEQUALITY 9, 20-23 (1985).
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an individual is civilly confined, rehabilitation is principally
uncontroversial. Rehabilitation of an individual serving a prison
sentence, however, presents a conflict between the retributive
and rehabilitative rationales: punishment presupposes choice
and responsibility, while treatment, in this setting, presupposes
the lack of choice and responsibility. The retributive rationale
presupposes individuals who are exercising their free will, while
the rehabilitative rationale presupposes individuals whose actions
are determined by their social, emotional, or psychological con-
dition - individuals who are not in control.
The simultaneous pursuit of punishment and treatment is
legitimate, however, if the person is, in some sense both free and
determined. Philosophically, arguments can be made that
humans are "essentially" one or the other."' The law, however,
is a more flexible and practical endeavor, and it recognizes that
human nature displays the qualities of both freedom and con-
straint. Treatment and care is appropriate to both individuals
who are culpable and those who are not. The difficulty in apply-
ing the law is determining the degree of individual culpability. If
culpable enough, the individual may be punished. Treatment, if
useful, may accompany this punishment. If, on the other hand,
any exercise of the will is sufficiently outweighed by sickness or
disability so as to make the person predominately irresponsible,
the degree of punishment appropriate may be so greatly reduced
that it is unreasonable for society to impose it at all. Then, treat-
ment or incapacitation becomes the appropriate, practical
response, insofar as any response at all is appropriate.
4. Incapacitation - The Prevention Rationale
Incapacitation occurs whenever an individual is confined,
regardless of the reasons for or conditions of confinement.
Unlike the first three rationales, incapacitation is not based
upon an assumption that human persons are rational and free or
sick and determined. The only basic presumption is that the
individual confined will act or is likely to act in an undesirable
101. The tension between our moral ideal and the assumptions of our
science is ably explored at length in LLoyn L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND
JUSTICE (1987). Weinreb concludes, "[t]he contradiction between freedom and
cause . . . is more than a weakness in our moral understanding ... or our
science .... It is an antinomy which cannot be overcome; it is complete and
final." Id. at 9. See generally, Matthew A. Pauley, The Jurisprudence of Crime and
Punishment from Plato to Hegel, 39 AM. J. Jumis. 97 (1994) (demonstrating that
each of the contemporary approaches to crime and punishment are closely
linked to assumptions about human nature by examining the contributions of
important western philosophers and sociologists).
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manner if he is not confined or otherwise restrained. The simple
goal, therefore, is to disable the individual. 112 Usually incapacita-
tion means denying the individual access to his potential victims
or placing the individual under enough control and supervision
to keep him from hurting himself or others.
Thus, prevention of harm is achieved whenever someone
dangerous is incapacitated - whether it be to punish, to deter,
or to treat. Whether the prevention of harm may be pursued by
itself, outside of the context of the other three rationales for con-
finement, however, is controversial."' A common objection to
incapacitation solely to prevent harm is that it involves highly fal-
lible predictions of future behavior.10 4 The degree of certainty
attainable or required to justify such detention, as well as the
degree to which the other three rationales support or discredit
commitment of a person who possesses a SPP or is a SDP, is at
the heart of much of the controversy surrounding Minnesota's
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute.
C. The Rationales Behind Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute
Rehabilitation and incapacitation are the two rationales that
justify civil commitment pursuant to Minnesota's Sexual Psycho-
pathic Personality Statute. The statute provides for commitment
that keeps these dangerous individuals from harming the public,
but it also requires they be given individualized care and treat-
ment. 0 5 These two rationales correspond to the two constitu-
tional requirements for involuntary civil commitment in the civil
system: that the person committed be both mentally ill and dan-
102. See generally Alfred Blumstein, Incapacitation, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra
note 56, at 873; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION:
PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME (1995).
103. Compare Note, Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through
Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv. L. REv. 511 (1982) (arguing in favor of the
adoption of the policy of selective incapacitation) with Jacqueline Cohen,
Selective Incapacitation: An Assessment 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 253 (setting out ethical
and empirical objections) and Leonard J. Long, Rethinking Selective
Incapacitation: More at Stake than Controlling Violent Crime, 62 UMKC L. REv. 107
(1993).
104. See, e.g., Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Stadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidenc 29 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1084 (1976); PETER W. GREENWOOD & SUSAN TURNER, SELECTIVE
INCAPACITATION REvISITED: WHY THE HIGH-RATE OFFENDERS ARE HARD TO
PREDICT (1987); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Dangerousness and
CriminalJustice, 85 MICH. L. REV. 481 (1986).
105. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.03 (West 1975).
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gerous.1 °6 This note argues that a person who possesses a SPP'or
is a SDP is dangerous and mentally ill, although not arguably in a
traditional medical sense. The purpose of commitment pursuant
to Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute is to treat
and incapacitate. As such, the commitment is constitutional.
Other views exist, however. Professor C. Peter Erlinder, the
author of an article critical of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute10 7 writes, "[a]lthough purportedly a civil com-
mitment statute, the failure of the Psychopathic Personality stat-
ute to require a medically recognized mental illness raises the
question whether its purpose is treatment or incarceration. If its
intention is incarceration, the statute should be cast into the
criminal category."108 Equating the imprecise term "incarcera-
tion" first with preventive detention and then with punishment,
Professor Erlinder asserts the legislative history indicates that the
purpose of the statute is preventive detention, not treatment. 0 9
The legislative history is confirmed, he asserts, because the condi-
tion of possessing a SPP or being a SDP is not "medically recog-
nized" and because these individuals are considered generally
untreatable. Accordingly, Professor Erlinder concludes, the stat-
ute constitutes "criminal" punishment in "civil" disguise. Even
worse, he writes, "the Psychopathic Personality statute punishes a
condition rather than an act."110 Unfortunately, Professor
Erlinder places misguided emphasis on the labels, "criminal" and
"civil." Purpose, not label, as evidenced by all the circumstances
surrounding confinement ought to be the focus. A failure to
look at purpose leads to serious flaws in reasoning that are
addressed in the following subsections.
106. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 77-78 (1992) (White, J., plurality
opinion). But see infra notes 216 and 222.
107. Erlinder, supra note 10. Professor Erlinder's article was written
before In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146
(1994) was decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota and before
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute was repealed and re-
enacted with amendments.
108. Id. at 122.
109. Id. at 103-04, 122-25.
110. Id. at 123. As stated above, the just imposition of punishment
requires a guilty mind and a guilty hand. See supra note 5. As such, it is
impermissible to punish a person for a state of being that he did not choose or
over which he currently possesses no control. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962) (holding [the status of] being an addict cannot be made
criminal consistent with Eighth Amendment); Cf. Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S.
224, 225-26 (1921) (possessing counterfeit checks construed to require
"conscious" possession to avoid constitutional issue).
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1. The Rationale for a Particular Instance of Confinement
Must be Deduced from All the Surrounding
Circumstances.
First, "punishment" must not be inferred from confinement
alone. While incapacitation, that is, confinement in order to pre-
vent harm to the person confined or to others, does constitute
preventive detention, it does not necessarily constitute punish-
ment, even in the absence of treatment for a "medically recog-
nized" mental illness. On the contrary, preventive detention
presumes only that the individual detained will act or is likely to
act in an undesirable manner, if he is not confined or otherwise
restrained. Accordingly, treatment is compatible with preventive
detention, but not analytically necessary. Preventive detention
may logically occur for its own sake," '1 in conjunction with treat-
ment in the civil system, or in conjunction with punishment in
the criminal system. The purpose of any particular confinement
must be determined by looking at all the relevant surrounding
circumstances. Accordingly, even if Professor Erlinder is correct
that no treatment accompanies confinement pursuant to Minne-
sota's statute, he cannot justifiably claim that the confinement
necessarily constitutes punishment.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, '12 the Supreme Court
examined whether the automatic forfeiture-of-citizenship provi-
sions of immigration laws amount to mere regulatory restraint or
punishment in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to
the Constitution. After examining the traditional tests used to
determine whether a governmental action is punitive, the Court
in Mendoza-Martinez concluded that courts must ultimately decide
whether some disability is imposed for the purpose of punish-
ment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose in light of various factors that may some-
times point in differing directions. ' Relying. on Mendoza-Marti-
nez, the Supreme Court found that confinement itself is neutral
111. See supra note 83.
112. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 1
113. The factors the Court stated are relevant to the inquiry whether a
governmental act is punitive in nature are:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation
will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned ..
Id at 168-69.
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on the issue of punishment in Bell v. Wolfish, 4 a case concerning
the constitutional rights of pre-trial detainees. In Bell, the Court
found, whether the pre-trial detention facility was called
ajail, a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facil-
ity is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are
inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility. And
the fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's
understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible
and with as little restraint as possible during confinement
does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention
into "punishment."' 15
Accordingly, the simple fact that the confinement of a person
who possesses a SPP or is a SDP may be involuntary, enduring,
and arguably uncomfortable, does not mean the commitment
constitutes punishment. Employing the language from Mendoza-
Martinez, the Court in Bell concludes that,
[a]bsent a showing of an expressed intent to punish ...
[whether a particular restriction or confinement imposed
by the state constitutes punishment] generally will turn on
'whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction
or confinement] may be rationally connected is assignable
for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it]."' 6
The "alternative purposes" assigned to confinement pursu-
ant to the Minnesota Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute are
rehabilitation and incapacitation. As stated by the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in Pearson,
[w]hile the abnormalities of the group placed under the
jurisdiction of the probate court by this act differ in form
from those which characterize inebriates, idiots and insane
persons, the need for observation and supervision is the
same, and the considerations which led this court.., to
recognize the latter as being proper subjects for guardian-
ship apply with equal force to the former. In the interest
of humanity and for the protection of the public, persons
so afflicted should be given treatment and confined for
that purpose rather than for the purpose of
punishment. 117
114. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
115. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 538 (quoting Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 at 168-69).
117. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297, 300 (Minn.
1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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The Pearson court's statement of purpose is affirmed in fact by
the actual conditions of confinement under the statute; they
reflect the purposes of rehabilitation and incapacitation, not ret-
ribution. Unlike most prison sentences, the length of commit-
ment under the Minnesota statute is indefinite.118  The
individual committed may be released whenever he is no longer
in need of treatment and no longer a threat to himself or
others." 9 The individual is committed to a secured hospital with
other mental patients, not to a prison with convicted
criminals. °12  In addition, more privileges are available in the
hospital than in the prison. For example, an individual commit-
ted pursuant to the Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute has
the right to be free from restraints, to correspond freely without
censorship, and to receive phone calls and visitors.1 2 1 Finally,
treatment is available and administered pursuant to individual-
ized program plans.1 22
Thus, commitment pursuant to Minnesota's Sexual Psycho-
pathic Personality Statute is not punishment. Preventive deten-
tion may logically occur apart from treatment or punishment.
Nevertheless, commitment pursuant to Minnesota's statute com-
bines preventive detention with treatment in an effort both to
incapacitate and to rehabilitate.
2. The Rationale for a Particular Instance of Confinement
May be Rehabilitation Despite the Lack of Effective
Treatment of a Medically Recognized
Condition
Even when Professor Erlinder concedes for argument's sake
that the purposes of Minnesota's Psychopathic Personality Stat-
ute are to incapacitate and rehabilitate, not punish, he still
asserts that the commitment is pure preventive detention or pun-
ishment because, in practice, the treatment offered is ineffective
and the condition being treated is not "medically recognized." 123
His argument, however, is unpersuasive.
First, persons committed pursuant to Minnesota's statute
may be treatable. The Supreme Court of Minnesota in Blodgett
refers to several. then ongoing efforts to discover effective treat-
118. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.18, subd. 3 (West Supp. 1995).
119. Id. § 253B.18, subds. 7 and 15; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916
(Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994).
120. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.18, subd. 1.
121. Id. § 253B.03.
122. Id.
123. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 116, 122, 141-42, 147-48, and 150-51.
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ment for sex offenders. 124 Dr. Barbara K. Schwartz, a scientist
involved in one of these efforts states, "[w]hile popular opinion
may continue to be 'nothing works,' thousands of professionals
are exploring 'what works.' "125 In fact, Dr. Schwartz states, "fur-
ther studies and more careful analysis of previous studies have
yielded positive outcomes in 47% to 86% of the programs stud-
ied."126 According to Dr. Schwartz, Paul Gendreau, former presi-
dent of the Canadian Psychological Association, asserted
appropriate treatment programs reduce recidivism by 53%.127
In spite of the pessimistic attitudes held by many, studies have
reported success in treating sex offenders.' 28
In addition, treatment may sometimes be ineffective only
because individuals refuse to cooperate. "It... seems incongru-
ous," the Supreme Court of Minnesota notes in Blodgett, "that a
sexual offender should be able to prove he is untreatable by
refusing treatment .... [The committed individual] 'may never
agree to be treated, but . . . the state has the power to keep
trying.' "129
Second, that rehabilitation may, ultimately, never be
attained, is irrelevant; when a reasonable, genuine treatment
effort is being made, its relative effectiveness is not the issue. A
lack of scientific understanding and an entirely effective treat-
124. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 n.12 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115
S.Ct. 146 (1994) (citing Barbara K. Schwartz, Ph.D., Effective Treatment
Techniques for Sex Offenders, 22 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 315 (June 1992) and Harry
L. Kozol et. al., The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME AND
DELINQUENCY 371, 381 (1972)).
125. Schwartz, supra note 124, at 319.
126. Id. at 315 (citing Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of
Treatment: Evidence from the 1980s, 4 JUSTICE QUAmERLY 349-408 (1987); P.
Freiberg, Rehabilitation is Effective if Done Well Studies Say, APA MONITOR 1, 3
(1990)).
127. Schwartz, supra note 124, at 315.
128. See, e.g., Mary Barker, What Do We Know About the Effectiveness of
Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment for Sex Offenders ?, 2 JOURNAL OF MErAL HEALTH 97
(1993); Ann S. Fordham, An Evaluation of Sex Offender Treatment Programmes, 19
ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL & LEGAL PSYCHOLOGY 60 (1993); Margit C.
Henderson et. al., Sexually Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A Theoretical Perspective
with Supportive Data, 61 PSYCHIATRIC QUARTERLY 273 (1990); William L. Marshall
and W. D. Pithers, A Reconsideration of Treatment Outcome with Sex Offenders, 21
CRIMINALJUSTICE & BEHAVIOR 10 (1994); William L. Marshall, The Treatment of
Sex Offenders: What Does Outcome Data Tell Us?, 8 JOURNAL OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 524 (1993); William L. Marshall et. al., Treatment Outcome with Sex
Offenders, 11 CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 465 (1991); Daniel L. Whitaker et.
al., Treatment of Sexual Offenders in a Community Mental Health Center: An
Evaluation, 7 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WORK & HUMAN SEXUALITY 49 (1988).
129. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
146 (1994) (quoting Matter of Wolf, 486 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Minn. 1992)).
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ment does not transform treatment into punishment or hospitals
into prisons. Legitimacy of effort, not outcome, is determinative.
In brief, commitment pursuant to Minnesota's Sexual Psycho-
pathic Personality Statute is not punishment, but a legitimate
form of preventive detention that provides for supervision and
mandates an attempt at treatment.
The second half of Professor Erlinder's objection - that
persons committed under the statute do not suffer from "medi-
cally recognized" conditions - is problematic for several rea-
sons. First, "medically recognized" is not only a highly
ambiguous term, but it is used in a highly ambiguous manner.
Certainly, no general consensus exists in the medical community
on the significance of the symptoms and conditions displayed by
repeat sexual offenders. On the other hand, doctors are willing
to testify at the commitment proceedings, presumably basing
their testimony on their medical expertise. Even if a general con-
sensus did exist on what constitutes a medical condition, a por-
tion of these persons committed under the statute may well
suffer from those "medically recognized" conditions and those
who do not may well exhibit "medically recognized" symptoms.
While the application of the statutory criteria does not precisely
mirror the diagnosis of well-recognized, specific medical afflic-
tions, the symptoms and tendencies of those whose lives are char-
acterized by pedophilia, sexual sadism, and anti-social personality
disorders - all included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders1 30 - are substantially similar, if not identi-
cal, to the symptoms and tendencies of those individuals the stat-
ute addresses.
In addition, Professor Erlinder arguably equates the term
"medically recognized" with the existence of effective treatment,
blending the second half of his objection into the first. But as
previously argued, the relative ineffectiveness of treatment efforts
cannot be fairly construed as conclusive evidence that no condi-
tion exists, treatable or otherwise. Condition and treatment are
related, but AIDS is no less a medical condition because science
is currently unable to cure it. In brief, the lack of an effective
treatment program has no significant bearing on the question of
whether some condition constitutes a "medically recognized"
mental illness. Schizophrenia, too, was no less a mental disease
because it was at one time misunderstood and difficult or impos-
130. AMEiucAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL. DISORDERs 279-89, 343-47 (3d. ed. 1987).
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sible to treat."' As stated in Eckerhart v. Hensley,13 2 a case examin-
ing the constitutional constraints on the treatment and
conditions at state mental hospitals, "[t]he state's inability to
improve [a dangerous person's] mental condition because no
effective treatment is known would not render unconstitutional
his involuntary confinement for the protection of himself or
others."13 3 Despite ineffectiveness in treatment, rehabilitation is
a rationale that, along with incapacitation, warrants commitment
under Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute.
Finally, even if the term "medically recognized" had mean-
ing apart from a measured treatment, a medically recognized
condition is hardly a constitutional prerequisite to lawful invol-
untary civil commitment. The constitutional requirements are,
in short, solely that the individual be mentally ill and danger-
ous."3 4 Without justifying his conclusion that "mental illness" in
this constitutional context must necessarily be "medically recog-
nized," Professor Erlinder predicts the confinement of "unpopu-
lar or socially eccentric persons" because the statutory definition
lacks a direct corollary in medicine. 3 5 Drawing an emotional
analogy to the Soviet Gulag, he writes,
the Supreme Court [has] ... noted that "[a] t one time or
another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior
which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a
mental or emotional disorder but which is in fact, within
the range of conduct that is generally acceptable." This is
precisely what the Psychopathic Personality Statute allows
by authorizing confinement based on the perceptions of
"abnormal behavior" held by a majority of the legislature
in 1939, rather than a currently recognized medical diag-
nosis of illness.' 3 6
On the contrary, the 1994 amendments to the Sexual Psycho-
pathic Personality Statute demonstrate the Minnesota legisla-
ture's current belief that serial rape and child molestation,
conduct typical of a person who possesses a SPP or is a SDP, is
131. See generally Marc H. Jacobs, What is Schizophrenia?, in TREATING
SCHIZOPHRENIA 1-25 (Sophia Vinogradov & Irvin D. Yalom eds., 1995) (tracing
the understanding of schizophrenia as it developed over the last century).
132. 475 F.Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
133. Id. at 914-15 n. 16.
134. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S 71, 77-78 (1992) (White, J., plurality
opinion). But see infra notes 216 and 222.
135. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 157.
136. Id. at 159.
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not merely "abnormal," and is quite outside "the range of con-
duct that is generally acceptable., 1
3 7
3. In the Context of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute, Mental Illness is Ultimately a
Term with a Legal Function and a Legal
Definition that Does Not Need a
Direct Analog in Medicine
More important, words with legal, not medical, functions
must ultimately be defined legally, not medically. The medical
meaning of "mental illness" is properly understood to be differ-
ent from the legal meaning of "mental illness. 138 In fact, the
meaning of "mental illness" or "insanity" varies from one legal
context to another.1 39 This is not evidence of arbitrary law-mak-
ing; it indicates that the law seeks practical ends. Law addresses
specific problems and serves various purposes, many of which are
quite distinct from the problems and purposes of medicine.
If the purposes of law and medicine were the same, the law
might well defer to medical definitions. Because they are not, it
cannot. As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit observed in McDonald v. United States,"4 a criminal prosecu-
tion involving the insanity defense, "mental disease" means one
thing to a physician bent on treatment, but something different,
albeit similar, to a court of law."' Medicine's purpose is to diag-
nosis and cure individuals who are ill. While treatment may be a
purpose of the law in civil commitment, the law also reflects
broader, sometimes conflicting purposes including maintaining
a peaceful and safe community. Accordingly, while the law
ought to take into account medical and psychological knowledge
in order to avoid becoming arbitrary, it must not let itself be
unduly constrained by medicine. If the law refused to act beyond
137. Id.
138. See Foucha v. United States, 504 U.S. 71, 96 ("The divergence
between law and psychiatry is caused in part by the legal fiction represented by
the words 'insanity' or 'insane,' which are a kind of lawyer's catchall and have
no clinical meaning.") (quoting J. BIGGs, THE GUILTY MIND 117 (1955)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 96 ("The legal and the
medical ideas of insanity are essentially different, and the difference is one of
substance.") (quoting 2 J. BOUVIER, LAw DICTIONARY 1590 (8th ed. 1914))
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139. See supra note 56. Unfortunately, the "lawyer's paradise where all
words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning" does not exist. JAMES B.
THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 428-29.
(1898).
140. 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
141. Id. at 851.
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the frontiers of the scientific disciplines of biology, sociology or
psychology, the law might well fail in its legal duties to punish, to
compensate or to protect. Medicine and law should act at cross
purposes as little as possible, but because each discipline is a sep-
arate discipline, some incongruity between categories, processes,
and the like is not only acceptable, but to be expected.
An examination of the modem development of the criminal
insanity defense in this country best demonstrates the need to
free the legislature and judiciary to determine for themselves the
meaning of a legal term such as "mental illness." Criminal
"insanity" has meant many things at different points in legal his-
tory; few of the formulations could be described as wholly corre-
sponding to medical knowledge.14 The point was recognized by
the dissent in Foucha v. Louisiana:
Profound differences [exist] between clinical insanity and
state-law definitions of criminal insanity. It is by now well
established that insanity as defined by the criminal law has
no direct analog in medicine or science.14 3
In 1954, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit lost sight of the distinction between clinical and criminal
insanity and took a wrong turn in its treatment of the criminal
insanity defense. The Circuit was distracted from its primary pur-
pose in criminal cases - to determine individual guilt - by doc-
tors whose primary purpose was to diagnose and to treat. The
results were disastrous. In Durham v. United States,"44 the Circuit
abandoned the M'Naghten "right-wrong" insanity test because the
Court believed, "[b]y its misleading emphasis on the cognitive,
the ... test requires court and jury to rely upon what is, scientifi-
cally speaking, inadequate, and most often, invalid and irrelevant
testimony in determining criminal responsibility."' 45 In its effort
- as the Circuit would later describe it - to "facilitate the giving
of testimony by medical experts in the context of a legal rule," 1'
the Circuit attempted to conform its legal definition of insanity
to the medical concept of insanity by adopting the so-called Dur-
ham test, that is, "an accused is not criminally responsible if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental
142. See generally LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 311-32 (describing the
traditional tests - M'Naghten "right-wrong" and "irresistible impulse" - and
the modern tests - Durham "product" and American Law Institute "substantial
capacity").
143. 504 U.S. 71, 96 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
144. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
145. Id. at 871-72.
146. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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defect."' 47 The Durham test, in effect, shifted responsibility for
determining the legal culpability of a defendant to doctors who
testified in medical terms. Once "'some evidence of mental dis-
order [was] introduced, . . .sanity, like any other fact, [had to]
be proved as a part of the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable
doubt.' "148 In fact, a district court in the District of Columbia
Circuit would later state that under the Durham test a "mere scin-
tilla of evidence" of the defendant's insanity would cast the bur-
den on the Government."4 9 The ease with which some evidence
that an act is the product of mental disease or defect can be
found, or rather, the ease with which a doctor willing to testify
that he found some evidence that an act is the product of a
mental disease or defect can be found, came close to eliminating
the criminal law's long-standing approach that treated all people
as presumptively sane.' After the adoption of the Durham test,
the number of insanity acquittals by the court as a matter of law
rose sharply until the Circuit squarely ruled that insanity was not
a medical question to be resolved by the court based on psychiat-
ric testimony, but a fact question to be resolved by a well-
instructed jury. 51
147. Durham, 214 F.2d at 874-75.
148. Id. at 866 (quoting Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612, 615 (1951),
aff'd, 249 F.2d 129 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 943 (1958) (quoting GLUECK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 41-42 (1925)).
149. In re Rosenfield, 157 F.Supp. 18, 20 (D.D.C. 1957), remanded sub
nom. Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
150. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra note 5, at 342-60 (outlining the
procedures applicable to presenting the insanity defense, including the burden
of proof); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (holding defendant is
presumed sane until contrary evidence introduced).
151. McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1962):
Our eight-year experience under Durham suggests a judicial definition,
however broad and general, of what is included in the terms 'disease'
and 'defect'. . . . Our purpose now is to make it very clear that neither
the court nor the jury is bound by ad hoc definitions or conclusions as
to what experts state is a disease or defect. What psychiatrists may
consider a 'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes, where their
concern is treatment, may or may not be the same as mental disease or
defect for the jury's purpose in determining criminal responsibility.
(emphasis added).
THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 550 (1966) reported that insanity acquittals under Durham dropped
sharply (more than 50%) and stabilized at two to three percent of all defend-
ants following McDonald,
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Finally, in 1972, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit overruled Durham in United States v. Brawner.52
Brawner rejected the Durham test because it permitted clinical
concepts to determine, without more, a legal result. 5 The
Brawner court observed:
In the absence of a definition of "mental disease or defect,"
medical experts attached to them the meanings which
would naturally occur to them - medical meanings -
and gave testimony accordingly. The problem was dramat-
ically highlighted by the weekend flip flop case, In re Rosen-
field, 157 F.Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957). The petitioner was
described as a sociopath. A St. Elizabeth's psychiatrist testi-
fied that a person with a sociopathic personality was not
suffering from a mental disease. That was Friday after-
noon. On Monday morning, through a policy change at
St. Elizabeth's Hospital, it was determined.., that the state
of a psychopathic or sociopathic personality did constitute
a mental disease.' 54
Thus, when psychiatric testimony determined criminal liability, it
changed, literally, overnight.
This shift in policy at St. Elizabeth's Hospital also resulted in
another problematic case, Blocker v. United States.' 55 In Blocker,
the defendant claimed insanity in defense of a murder charge.' 5 6
Three psychiatrists testified at the defendant's trial, one for the
Government and two for the defendant. Although the doctor
testifying for the Government found no evidence that the
defendant was insane, all three doctors testified that a soci-
opathic personality was not a mental disease or defect. 5 Less
than a month after the defendant was convicted, St. Elizabeth's
changed its policy. Based on St. Elizabeth's decision to, in the
future, label people suffering from sociopathic personality distur-
bance as mentally ill, the Blocker court granted the defendant a
new trial.' In Brawner, the Circuit acknowledged that contin-
ued shifts in legal culpability without corresponding change in
defendants or the law was unacceptable.
152. 471 F.2d 969, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (adopting the American Law
Institute's "substantial capacity" insanity test based on § 4.01 of the Model Penal
Code).
153. Id. at 975-78, 981-85.
154. Id. at 978.
155. 274 F.2d 572 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
156. Id. at 572.
157. Id. at 572-73.
158. Id. at 573.
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Although the conflict between law and medicine is especially
conspicuous in decisions like Rosenfield and Blocker, it is always a
serious concern. Advances in medical knowledge and treatment
may come slowly or quickly and sometimes come on a case by
case basis. The law, however, requires uniform rules and the
equal treatment of similarly situated individuals. Because the
medical community does not have a single understanding of
insanity or mental illness and because many diverse legal situa-
tions arise in which mental health and competency are issues, the
Supreme Court has left the states free, constitutionally, to define
insanity for themselves.
The Supreme Court put it well in Leland v. Oregon:159 The
"choice of a test of legal insanity involves not only scientific
knowledge but questions of basic policy as to the extent to which
that knowledge [of right and wrong] should determine criminal
responsibility."16 ° In the absence of clear guidance in the text of
the Constitution or our constitutional traditions, the resolution
of such issues is best left to the states. Justice Marshall, speaking
for a plurality of the Court in Powell v. Texas, 161 a case examining
whether punishing an alcoholic for public intoxication consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment, agreed: "Nothing could be
less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some
sort of insanity test in constitutional terms.... It is simply not yet
the time to write into the Constitution formulas cast in terms
whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear to doctors or
lawyers." 162
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute draws
on the notion of legal insanity tojustify the civil commitment of a
person who has a SPP or is a SDP. Because the statutory criteria
are parallel to the irresistible impulse insanity test, the constitu-
tional requirement that persons be "mentally ill" before they can
be involuntarily committed in the civil system is satisfied. The
fact that these persons "act[ ] destructively for reasons not fully
understood by our medical, biological and social sciences"
163
should not be allowed to paralyze the law. Critics ought to stop
arguing mindlessly that legal terms must reflect medical defini-
tions and focus on these individuals' need for treatment and
supervision, Minnesota's constitutional right to attempt to pro-
vide it, and the danger to the public if these people are released.
159. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
160. Id. at 800.
161. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion).
162. Id. at 536-37.
163. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 918 (Minn.) cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
146 (1994).
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The Minnesota Supreme Court put it well in Blodgett when it
observed:
The argument against the constitutionality of civil commit-
ment for a psychopathic personality is that the condition is
not a mental illness, at least not one medically recognized,
or at least not yet. But while the term "psychopathic per-
sonality" is considered outmoded today, the reality it
describes is not; this reality, even if it is not currently classi-
fied as a mental illness, does not appear to be a mere social
maladjustment.... Whatever the explanation or label, the
"psychopathic personality" is an identifiable and docu-
mentable violent sexually deviant condition or disor-
der .... The problem is not what medical label best fits
statutory criteria, but whether these criteria may, constitu-
tionally, warrant civil commitment."16
4
In sum, Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute
allows the state to incapacitate and attempt to rehabilitate indi-
viduals who because they either possess a SPP or are a SDP are
both mentally ill and dangerous within the meaning of constitu-
tional jurisprudence. As long as both treatment and the preven-
tion of harm are the purposes pursued, whether one of the two
goals is pursued with greater success or efficiency ought not be
crucial. In the end, bickering over medical terminology ought to
give way to practical legal solutions.
D. The Use of Predictions of Dangerousness in Order to
Prevent Harm
One of the two goals of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute is to prevent harm to the public. When Min-
nesota commits an individual under its statute, the state con-
cludes, based in part upon an individual's pattern of prior sexual
misconduct,165 that an individual will or is likely to harm others
in the future if he is not confined. Nevertheless, many assert that
predictions of future dangerousness are so fallible that confine-
ment based on a prediction of future dangerousness is a dubious
endeavor constitutionally. 66 Although prevention of harm is not
the only goal of Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute, to the extent that commitment under the statute relies
164. Id. at 914-15.
165. A SPP must be evidenced by "a habitual course of misconduct in
sexual matters." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a. A SDP must have
engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct." Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18b.
166. See supra note 104.
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on a prediction of future dangerousness, these concerns must be
addressed.
Disapproval of the use of predictions of dangerousness to
justify what is, in part, preventive detention may be rebutted in
three ways. First, the prevention of harm is a legitimate and
compelling legal goal. Second, prediction is a common and nec-
essary feature of the legal system. Predictions are constantly
made without undue difficulty in many areas of legal decision-
making. Third, while prediction does involve some uncertainty,
the degree of uncertainty involved in the prediction of future
dangerousness is acceptable here in light of the exacting statu-
tory criteria and the.experience of high recidivism rates.'6 7
1. Preventing Harm is a Legitimate and Compelling Legal
Goal
Although preventing harm cannot by itself justify civil com-
mitnent under Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute, it is a legitimate goal that the legal system must vigor-
ously pursue. Prevention of harm serves as a basis for confining
dangerous individuals in numerous situations, both criminal and
civil.
In 1984 in Schall v. Martin, s68 the Supreme Court held that
the pretrial detention ofjuveniles based on a finding that a seri-
ous risk exists that the child may commit an act that if committed
by an adult would constitute a crime was a "legitimate state objec-
tive" and was constitutional.16 9 In that same year, Congress
passed 18 U.S.C. § 3124 as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.
18 U.S.C. § 3124 allows the pretrial detention of an individual
accused of a crime if necessary to ensure the appearance of the
defendant at trial or the safety of any other person or the com-
munity. The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3124 was challenged
in United States v. Salerno.7 ° In Salerno, the Court held, "[t]here
is no doubt that preventing danger to the community is a legiti-
mate regulatory goal .... We have repeatedly held that the Gov-
ernment's regulatory interest in community safety can, in
appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty inter-
167. See generally ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT: RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1983 (1989); Park Elliot Deiz, Sex
Offenders: Behavioral Aspects, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 56, at 1485; JOHN
MONAHAN, PREDICTION OF CRIME AND RECIDIVISM, id. at 1170.
168. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
169. Id. at 255-57.
170. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
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est."' 71 Relying on Schall, the Court held that the pretrial deten-
tion of dangerous arrestees under the Bail Reform Act did not
violate the Due Process Clause. 172 The abundance of situations
where preventive detention is permitted in order to protect the
public demonstrates the interest in preventing crime and other
harmful conduct is legitimate and compelling.
2. Prediction is a Common and Necessary Feature of the
Legal System
Empirical certainty is not a necessary precondition to legal
action. 7 If it were, little could be legally accomplished. In fact,
prediction is constantly and successfully employed in both crimi-
nal and civil situations. Prediction, for example, is used to deter-
mine the length of criminal sentences,17 whether to terminate
parental rights,' 75 and whether to grant parole,176 injunctions, 77
and bail prior to trial.' 78 Each of these situations involve substan-
tial, even constitutionally fundamental, individual rights. As
Marc Miller and Professor Norval Morris state, "a jurisprudence
171. Id. at 747-49. The Court then gave numerous examples of other
times where the government's interest in community safety can outweigh an
individual's liberty interest. Id. at 748. The Court noted that the government
may detain: in times of war or insurrection, individuals it believes to be
dangerous, including enemy aliens. Ludeck v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948),
Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909); potentially dangerous resident
aliens pending deportation proceedings, Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537-
42 (1952), Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, (1896); those who are
mentally ill and dangerous, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979);
dangerous individuals who become incompetent to stand trial, Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 731-39 (1972), Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366
(1956); dangerous juveniles once arrested, Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264
(1984); and an arrested individual awaiting a determination of probable cause,
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
172. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750.
173. See, e.g., LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 48-61 (reviewing burden of
proof and related issues in the criminal law).
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(c) (1994).
175. See, e.g., Matter of Guardianship of Mendes, 428 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1980),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Sylvia M., 443
N.Y.S.2d 214 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Matter of Guardianship and Custody of
Nereida S., 439 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1982). The court held that a Social Services
Law provision allowing termination of parental rights if a parent cannot
provide a normal home for the child in the foreseeable future was not
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 421.
176. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 4206-07 (1994); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974)
(upholding suit for civil RICO injunction against future illegal conduct), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(g).
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that pretends to exclude the role of predictions of dangerousness
is self-deceptive. "179
Although prediction necessarily involves uncertainty, predic-
tion is an essential component of our legal system. The proper
reaction to uncertainty is not asserting that prediction can never
be a valid basis for confinement, but ensuring adequate due pro-
cess protection both prior to, during, and following commit-
ment. Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute
provides for elaborate and detailed procedural protection. 8 °
These procedures will allow any necessary attacks on the credibil-
ity or reliability of the evidence offered to prove dangerousness
in any particular case."'
3. The Level of Uncertainty Involved in Predicting
Dangerousness is Acceptable
While uncertainty exists in predicting dangerousness, it
should not be overstated. The Supreme Court recognizes the
permissibility of preventive detention, which necessarily involves
the prediction of future dangerousness, in numerous situa-
tions. " ' In fact, the Supreme Court in Schall observed:
[F]rom a legal point of view there is nothing inherently
unattainable about a prediction of future criminal con-
duct. Such a judgment forms an important element in
many decisions, and we have specifically rejected the con-
tention, based on the same sort of sociological data relied
upon by appellees and the district court, "that it is impossi-
179. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness: Ethical
Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NoTRF DAME J.L. ETmcs & PuB. POL'Y 393, 395
(1986).
180. See supra notes 13-44 and accompanying text.
181. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983). In the course of
upholding a statute that, in effect, allowed a finding of future dangerousness to
justify a death sentence, the Court rejected the argument that "psychiatrists,
individually and as a group, are incompetent to predict with an acceptable
degree of reliability that a particular criminal will commit other crimes in the
future and so represent a danger to the community .. . ." Id. at 896. The
factfinder, the Court pointed out, has the benefit of cross-examination and
contrary evidence by the opposing party. Id. at 898.
Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be countered not
only as erroneous in a particular case but also as generally so
unreliable that it should be ignored.... We are unconvinced.., that
the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from
the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness,
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present
his own side of the case.
Id. at 889-901.
182. See supra notes 168-71, 174-78 and accompanying text.
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ble to predict future behavior and that the question is so
vague as to be meaningless."1 8 3
While studies suggest that clinical prediction is unreliable,1 8 4
these claims must be qualified by the high rate of recidivism
among sexual offenders. 85 In addition, to the extent that recidi-
vism is estimated by referring to arrests, it must be assumed recid-
ivism will be greatly underestimated. Self-reporting by the
offenders themselves shows the great disparity that exists
between official records and actual incidents. A number of sex
offenders committed under a sexual predator statute in Washing-
ton anonymously provided information regarding their criminal
acts. Law enforcement records showed a mean of 1.8 rape vic-
tims per offender, but the offenders reported a mean of 11.7 vic-
tims per offender. Law enforcement records stated the
offenders, as a group, had been charged with a total of 66 sex
offenses, but the offenders reported a total of 433 actual rapes. 186
Child molesters were also interviewed in the same study. Law
enforcement records showed that the group had molested 135
different victims, but the group confessed to molesting 959 dif-
ferent victims. 187 The degree of recidivism must also be consid-
ered in light of the fact that many crimes go unreported,
especially sexual crimes like rape and molestation - the type of
crimes primarily addressed by Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
183. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278-79 (1984) (quoting Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976); id. at 279, (White, J., concurring)).
184. See supra note 104.
185. Although, results vary significantly from study to study, the Supreme
Court of Washington found that the target population of its sexually violent
predator law were usually repeat offenders and displayed rates of recidivism as
high as 80%. In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1003-04 (Wash. 1993). The
Washington State Institute for Public Policy predicted 24% of the sex offenders
convicted between 1985 and 1991 will be arrested again. Gayle M.B. Hanson,
Experts Vexed at What to Do with Sex Offenders; Authorities Try New Methods for
Tracking Them, WASH. TmiEs, June 6, 1994, at A8. One study followed up 178
known rapists and child molesters for 50 to 88 months and found 27.5% were
convicted of a new sex offense and 40% were arrested, convicted, or returned to
the psychiatric facility for a new violent or sex offense. Vernon L. Quinsey,
Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidivism, 10 J. or INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 85
(1995). See also generally A. Nicholas Groth, Robert E. Longo and J. Bradley
-McFadin, Undetected Recidivism Among Rapists and Child Molesters, 28 CRIME &
DEUNQUENCY 450 (1982).
186. Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by
Sex Offenders, 6J. INTERPERSONAL VIoLNcE 286, 291 (1991).
187. Id. See also Gene G. Abel & Joanne L. Rouleau, THE NATURE AND
EXTENT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: ISSUES,
THEORIES, AND TREATmENT Or THE OFFENDER 9-21 (William L. Marshall et al.
eds., 1990) (describing one study where 561 sex offenders admitted to more
than 288,000 criminal acts with a total of more than 195,000 victims).
1996] IA)EFINrE CIWL COMMITMENT OF DANGEROUS SEX ORFDERS 269
Personality Statute."' Finally, as Marc Miller and Professor
Norval Morris observe in their article on predictions of
dangerousness:
Given the relative rarity of the event to be predicted -
violent criminality - a base expectancy rate of one in
three [over a several-year period] is not a low rate of pre-
diction: it is a very high rate of prediction. The relation-
ships among personal characteristics and social
circumstances - among character, personality, and
chance - are obviously of extreme complexity and thus
most difficult to predict; but a group of three people, one
of whom within a few months will commit a crime of
extreme personal violence, is a very dangerous group
indeed.19
In Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates,'90 while commenting
on the due process implications of Nebraska's parole system, the
Supreme Court observed: "[T]here simply is no constitutional
guarantee that all executive decisionmaking must comply with
standards that assure error-free determinations." 9 ' Legal deci-
sion-makers - executive, legislative, or judicial - must exercise
judgment. The judgment exercised by the Minnesota legislature
by enacting the Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute and the
judicial judgment required by the statute are not significantly dif-
ferent or less certain than legal judgments made in other con-
texts. The Supreme Court in Pearson observed: The "underlying
conditions... [to be proved under the Sexual Psychopathic Per-
sonality Statute], are as susceptible of proof as many of the crite-
ria constantly applied in prosecutions for crime."1 92While uncertainty is undesirable, it is also unavoidable. The
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute contains specific criteria
and provides for ample procedural due process protection. As
such, the degree of uncertainty is reduced to an acceptable level
188. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, HIGHLIGHTS
FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME VICTrMs: THE NATIONAL CRIME
VicrmiZATION SURVEY, 1973-92 (1993) (finding rape reported at 53%). In fact,
a recent New York Times article reported that the Justice Department just
doubled its estimation of rapes or attempted rapes to 310,000 annually not
because more assaults are occurring, but because surveyors questioned victims
about sexual assaults directly. Previous surveys only asked about attacks of any
kind without mentioning rape or sexual assault. With New Questions Used, F.B.L
Doubles Its Estimate of Rapes, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 17, 1995, at AO.
189. Marc Miller & Norval Morris, supra note 179, at 408.
190. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
191. Id. at 7.
192. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309
U.S. 270, 274 (1940).
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in light of the serious social danger that this statutory scheme
seeks to combat.
E. Expanding Civil Commitment is Preferable to Diverting the
Criminal System from its Requirement of Moral
Blameworthiness
The civil and criminal categories were developed to realize
different purposes.' 93 Accordingly, the categories might well
expand if those purposes would, thereby, be served appropri-
ately. A person who possesses a SPP or is a SDP is partially
responsible and deserving of punishment, but the person is also
partially irresponsible and in need of treatment. Either way, pub-
lic safety requires that such a person be at least incapacitated. By
enacting its Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, Minnesota
expanded the scope of its civil commitment. The elements of
the statute demonstrate that Minnesota decided these sex offend-
ers are more "mad" than "bad." Accordingly, expanding civil
commitment is preferable to the alternative: expanding the
scope of criminal confinement through longer sentences or a
"guilty but mentally ill" statute. It is better to incapacitate and
treat someone who is somewhat culpable, than to punish some-
one who is predominately blameless.
Professor Erlinder and the dissenters in Blodgett suggest
longer sentences or perhaps even life sentences are the appropri-
ate response to the problem of sexual predators.194 Professor
Erlinder claims that Minnesota's statute is, in fact, retribution dis-
guised as rehabilitation. 9 ' Ironically, the imposition of longer
or life sentences may also be aptly termed incapacitation dis-
guised as retribution. Professor Erlinder argues that the statute
wrongly allows the state to punish people not for what they have
done, but for who they are or what they may do. 196 He then
contradicts himself by advocating a longer or life sentence, not
because the offender has committed a worse crime, but because
the offender is a dangerous person who may cause more harm in
the future.197 While sexually violent crimes, including child
molestation and rape, are admittedly heinous, Minnesota would
hardly have suddenly decided that they are worse crimes than
formerly realized if it imposed life sentences. The nature of the
193. See supra part III. A.
194. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 158; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 924
(Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994).
195. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 122-25.
196. Id. at 103-04, 122-25.
197. Id. at 158.
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crime or the harm it entails would not have changed, and
increased deterrence could probably not be expected. An
increased prison sentence would not be, therefore, merely an
adjustment to reflect new understanding. It would be, in short,
additional punishment based on who a person is and what they
may do, not on what they have done, precisely what Professor
Erlinder counsels against.
Even for those who truly believe that the sentences presently
imposed for violent, sexual crimes are inadequate, increasing the
length of sentences creates other difficulties. In light of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the subject, any punishment
short of death for any serious crime will .likely not violate the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. 98 Accordingly, states could simply lock up sexual
predators for life once they were convicted of one offense.
Adopting this sort of policy, however, might turn out to be
counterproductive. A more severe sentence sometimes makes a
conviction harder to obtain.1 99 Longer sentences may often
mean that many defendants will be acquitted or that many of
them will be able to plea bargain to lesser offenses.
Longer or life sentences may also exact a heavy price on the
criminal justice system. The Minnesota Supreme Court aptly
comments, "the question is not whether the sexual predator can
be confined, but where. Should it be in prison or in a security
hospital?"2"' Summarizing an article by Professor Paul H. Robin-
198. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
plurality opinion). The petitioner in Harmelin was convicted of possessing 672
grams of cocaine. Although the Court was divided on whether the Eighth
Amendment involves a guarantee of proportional punishment, a majority of the
Court held the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without possibility of
parole, and without any consideration of mitigating factors such as the fact that
the petitioner had no prior felony convictions, was constitutional. See also
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (holding the imposition of a life
sentence, under a recidivist statute, upon a defendant who had been convicted,
successively, of fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or
services, passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and obtaining $120.75
by false pretenses); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (rejecting the Eighth
Amendment challenge to a prison term of 40 years and a fine of $20,000 for
possession and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marijuana).
199. SeeJOHANNEs ANDERSON, supra note 96, at 970 ("Experience seems to
show that excessively severe penalties may actually reduce the risk of conviction,
thereby leading to results contrary to their purpose."); Fox Butterfield, '3
Strikes"Law in California is Clogging Courts and Jails, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at
Al (reporting juries failing to convict since they do not want to impose long
sentences for petty crimes).
200. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 917 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
146 (1994).
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son 2°1 the Court continues, "The concern with enhanced crimi-
nal punishment on the basis of dangerousness is that the
punishment may become divorced from moral blameworthiness,
thus adversely affecting the criminal justice system's credibility,
which largely rests on a sense of moral blameworthiness." 20 2 In
other words, people believe punishment is legitimate only when
they believe it is imposed on those who chose to do wrong.
Divorcing criminal punishment from moral blameworthiness by
increasing sentences not for what someone does, but for who
they are or what they may do arguably reduces the credibility and
legitimacy of the criminal law. It may also reduce its efficacy. If
the system is perceived as illegitimate, no stigma will attach to
breaking the law; without stigma the level of obedience will
drop.20 3 In order to maintain the integrity and efficacy of the
criminal justice system, Minnesota rightly chose to expand its
civil commitment to accommodate sexually dangerous persons
and persons with sexual psychopathic personalities.
In sum, as Professor Paul H. Robinson argues, "it [is] better
to expand civil commitment to include seriously dangerous
offenders who are excluded from criminal liability as blameless
for any reason, than to divert the criminal justice system from its
traditional requirement of moral blame."2 4 Individuals commit-
ted pursuant to Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute require incapacitation and treatment, not punishment.
Even if they are never rehabilitated, they belong in a hospital
both for their sake and the sake of the system.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MINNESOTA'S SEXUAL
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY STATUTE
After examining how Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Per-
sonality Statute operates and the goals it is trying to achieve, one
final question remains: whether the incapacitation of a person
who possess a SPP or is a SDP in order to treat that person and
protect the public is constitutional. Statutes relating to sexual
psychopaths similar to Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Person-
ality Statute are challenged constitutionally on a number of
grounds including due process - both substantive and proce-
201. Robinson, supra note 97.
202. Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918 n.16.
203. See supra note 97. Compare with GORDON HAWKINS, Punishment as a
Moral Educator, GERBER & MCANANY, supra note 75, at 120-28 (arguing that
"socializing" rather than "moralizing" more accurately describes effect of
punishment).
204. Robinson, supra note 97, at 716.
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dural, equal protection, double jeopardy, and so on.2°5 This
note, however, focuses solely on equal protection and due pro-
cess as they are the most significant grounds for challenge.
A. United States v. Foucha
In the fifty-five years since Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute was held constitutional in United States v. Pear-
son,2 11 the Supreme Court issued a number of opinions dealing
with the constitutional issues surrounding civil commitment.20
In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Foucha v. Louisiana"°8 and
took its latest step toward clarifying the standards surrounding
involuntary civil commitment.
Terry Foucha, after entering the home of a married couple
with intent to steal, brandishing a revolver, and firing on the
police officers who confronted him as he fled, was arrested and
charged with aggravated burglary and the illegal use of a
weapon.209 Foucha entered a dual plea of not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity. In Louisiana, when such a plea is
entered, the factfinder must first determine whether the defend-
ant committed the crime with which he is charged. If the
factfinder determines that the defendant did commit that crime,
only then may the factfinder proceed to a determination of
whether or not the defendant was sane at the time the crime was
committed and thereby criminally responsible for committing it.
On October 12, 1984 the trial court ruled that Foucha was not
guilty by reason of insanity. This means that Foucha was found
to have committed the crime, but he was relieved of criminal
responsibility for committing it.
Foucha was then committed to a psychiatric hospital. In
1988, the superintendent of the facility recommended that
Foucha be released. A hospital review panel reported no evi-
dence of mental illness developed since admission and recom-
205. See V. Woerner, Annotation, Statutes Relating to Sexual Psychopaths, 24
A.L.R.2d 350 (1952); Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Applicability, in Proceedings
Under Statutes Relating to Sexual Psychopaths, of Constitutional Provisions for
Protection of a Person Accused of Crime, 34 A.L.R.3d 652 (1970). See, e.g., Young v.
Weston, 898 F.Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding Washington's sexually
violent predator statute is criminal and violates the due process, ex post facto
and double jeopardy clauses of the United States Constitution). Unfortunately,
a discussion of the constitutionality of the sexual predator or psychopath
statutes of other states is beyond the scope of this article.
206. 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
207. See supra note 70.
208. 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (White, J., plurality opinion).
209. The following facts are taken from the case Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71 (1992) (White, J., plurality opinion).
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mended that Foucha be conditionally released. The trial court
then appointed two doctors to examine Foucha. They reported
that Foucha was in remission from his mental illness, but refused
to certify Foucha would not constitute a menace to himself or
others if released. One of the doctors also testified that Foucha
possessed an anti-social personality. The doctor did not consider
the anti-social personality to be a mental illness. The doctor
believed that the anti-social personality would contribute to
Foucha's dangerousness to himself or others if he were to be
released.
Under Louisiana law, the trial court found Foucha was still a
danger to himself and others and ordered him returned to the
psychiatric hospital. The Court of Appeals refused supervisory
writs, and the State Supreme Court affirmed, holding Foucha
had not met the burden placed upon him by Louisiana law to
prove that he was no longer dangerous. The State Supreme
Court also held that the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v.
United States"'° did not require Foucha's release, and that the
Louisiana statutes allowing the continued confinement of an
insanity acquittee based on his dangerousness alone, without any
finding of continued mental illness, did not violate either the
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1' The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the constitutionality of Louisiana's commitment
scheme in light of their prior decisions on civil commitment,
especially Jones.
Writing for the majority in Jones, Justice Powell stated: "The
question presented is whether petitioner, who was committed to
a mental hospital upon being acquitted of a criminal offense by
reason of insanity, must be released because he has been hospi-
talized for a period longer than he might have served in prison
had he been convicted."212 The Court specifically added: "Nor
are we asked to decide whether the District [of Columbia] 's pro-
cedures for release are constitutional."' Yet, in the course of
deciding the issue presented, the Court also decided a second
issue: whether the Due Process Clause permits a state to civilly
commit a criminal defendant automatically and solely on the
basis of his insanity acquittal when the defendant has established
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not guilty by
reason of insanity.
210. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
211. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75.
212. Jones, 463 U.S. at 356.
213. Id. at 363 n.10.
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In Jones, the petitioner argued that the Due Process stan-
dards established by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas1 4
were not met because "the judgment of not guilty by reason of
insanity did not constitute a finding of present mental illness and
dangerousness and because it was established only by a prepon-
derance.21 Jones states that the Court held in Addington "that the
Due Process Clause requires the Government in a civil-commit-
ment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. "216 An
insanity acquittal necessarily involves the determination that the
defendant committed a crime and was insane at the time. This
determination, the Jones Court held, gives rise to a reasonable
inference of both dangerousness and continuing mental illness
- the constitutional requirements for civil commitment.217 The
214. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
215. Jones, 463 U.S. at 362.
216. Id. at 362 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27). Actually, this
proposition is not what the Court held in Addington. The question presented in
Addington was "what standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under state law
to commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period of time to a state
mental hospital." Addington, 441 U.S. at 419-20. The standard of proof was the
only issue presented; the constitutional requirements for civil commitment
were not before the Court. In fact, the Court itself stated in Addington, "[a] fter
oral argument it became clear that no challenge to the constitutionality of any
Texas statute was presented." Id. at 422. That which is not argued is not
decided. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am. Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 202, 208 n.2
(1956) (holding that questions that are not considered are not decided). The
discussion of the requirements for involuntary civil commitment under the
Texas Mental Health Code at pages 426-27 cited by the Court in Jones was pure
dicta. The dicta was ambiguous as well. It read: "Under the Texas Mental
Health Code, however, the State has no interest in confining individuals
involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to
themselves or others." Jones, 463 U.S. at 426-27. This sentence could be
interpreted as a statement of the specific requirements under Texas law or as a
statement of the general constitutional requirements applicable to all civil
commitment in light of Texas law. In addition, the use of "or" creates
ambiguity. The word "or" can be used exclusively meaning "this or that, not
both," but it can also be used inclusively meaning "this or that or both." If both,
the word "or" is equivalent to the word "and." See, e.g., United States v. Fisk, 70
U.S. 445, 447 (1865) (treating the construction of "or" and "and" as a matter of
policy). Thus, the Court may have meant the State (either Texas or all states
including Texas) may not confine an individual involuntarily unless he is both
mentally ill and dangerous. But the Court may have also meant the State
(either Texas or all states including Texas) may not confine an individual
involuntarily when he is both sane and safe. The meaning is unclear, as well as
being merely dicta. The Court in Jones, however, elevates this dicta into the
"holding" of Addington and establishes a new constitutional standard for civil
commitment under the guise of following precedent.
217. Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66.
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Court did not object that the finding of insanity was supported
only by a preponderance of the evidence, despite the Addington
requirement that civil commitment be supported by clear and
convincing evidence, because of "the important differences
between the class of potential civil-commitment candidates and
the class of insanity acquittees."21 8 Addington, the Court explains
in Jones, was concerned that individuals who displayed merely idi-
osyncratic behavior might be wrongfully committed under the
low standard of proof and irreparably stigmatized.21 9 The Court
in Jones finds, however, that since automatic commitment in this
context follows only if the acquittee himself advances the insanity
defense and proves that his criminal act was a product of his
mental illness, there is "good reason for diminished concern as
to the risk of error" and the commitment results in little addi-
220tional stigma.
After determining that the automatic commitment of an
insanity acquittee was acceptable, the Court in Jones decided the
central issue presented: whether an insanity acquittee, once com-
mitted, may be held longer than he could have been imprisoned
had he been convicted. This issue was resolved by examining the
purpose behind confinement. "Different considerations under-
lie commitment of an insanity acquittee "22' as opposed to impris-
onment of a convicted criminal. "The purpose of commitment
following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil commitment," the
Jones Court held was "to treat the individual's mental illness and
protect him and society from his potential dangerousness. The
committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered
his sanity or is no longer dangerous." 222 The insanity acquittee
218. Id. at 367.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 369.
222. Id. at 368 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76
(1975). The Jones Court once again cites to a precedent that does not support
its claim. O'Connor did not hold a committed acquittee is entitled to release as
soon as he recovers his'sanity or is no longer dangerous. In O'Connor, the Court
held that a "finding of 'mental illness' alone cannot justify a State's locking a
person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial
confinement." O'Connor, 442 U.S. at 575 (emphasis added). O'Connor's holding
was based in large part on the jury's finding that the committed individual was
receiving no treatment. Id. at 573-75. In fact, the Court specifically held that
"there is no reason now to decide .. .whether the State may compulsorily
confine a non-dangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment." Id. at
573 (emphasis added). Despite this statement, the holding of O'Connor is
consistently interpreted to be that a state may not civilly commit a mentally ill
individual who is not dangerous to himself or others, an interpretation that is
itself not so troubling. Neither is the Jones Court's application of O'Connor to
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may, in fact, be released, the Court reasoned, no matter how seri-
ous a crime he has committed.2"' By the same token, an insanity
acquittee who committed a less serious crime may be confined
for a longer period if he has not recovered.224 Thus, the Court
states, "[t] here simply is no necessary correlation between sever-
ity of the offense and length of time necessary for recovery. The
length of the acquittee's hypothetical criminal sentence there-
fore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment. "225
In Foucha, when the Supreme Court indicated that it granted
certiorari "[b]ecause the case presents an important issue and
was decided by the court below in a manner arguably at odds
with prior decisions of this Court,"226 it referred primarily to
Jones. The question presented in Foucha was whether the Four-
teenth Amendment requires a state to release a dangerous indi-
insanity acquittees; presumably, once insanity acquittees are civilly committed
they are subject to the same standards as those committed in a civil proceeding.
But see Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 90-102 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). See also Foucha, 504 U.S. at 102-26 (Thomas, J., dissenting). What is
troubling is that the Jones Court misstates the holding in O'Connor; the Court in
O'Connor addressed the constitutional standards for the release of a non-
dangerous, mentally ill person, not the release of a non-mentally ill, dangerous
person. Thus, O'Connor stands only for the proposition that a person who is no
longer dangerous must be released, not the proposition that a person who is no
longer mentally ill must be released. The Jones Court also fails to state whether
the asserted right to release arises under the District of Columbia law being
interpreted in the case or under the Constitution generally. This ambiguity -
statute or Constitution - led the Supreme Court of Louisiana to decide Jones
did not require Foucha's release. In Foucha, the issue that was not decided by
the Court in O'Connor nor presented in Jones - whether a dangerous person
who is no longer mentally ill must be released - was finally presented. The
uncertainty was laid to rest in favor of the assumption in Jones when the Court in
Foucha states, "The court below was in error in characterizing the [statement in
Jones] as merely an interpretation of the pertinent statutory law in the District of
Columbia and as having no constitutional significance." Foucha, 504 U.S. at 78.
Even though this statement was made by a mere plurality, Justice O'Connor in
her concurrence and even the dissenters also assume the standard as stated with
regard to at least those civilly committed, if not insanity acquittees as well.
Thus, even though the O'Connor Court did not hold that a person must be
released from civil commitment when he regains his sanity, this was assumed in
Jones and Foucha, at least with regard to those who were committed pursuant to
a civil proceeding as opposed to those were committed as insanity acquittees.
While the argument that the dangerous may be held after they regain sanity
may remain viable with respect to those committed as insanity acquittees, it
appears to be futile as applied to those who are committed in a civil
proceeding, like those committed under Minnesota's statute.
223. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
224. Id.
225. Id,
226. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75.
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vidual committed as an insanity acquittee when he regains his
sanity..
The Court's consideration of this question resulted in a
sharply divided court: Justice White wrote for a plurality of the
Court made up of himself and Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter; Justice O'Connor filed an opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment; Justice Kennedy filed a dissent-
ing opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined; and Justice
Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia joined.
The plurality asserts: "We held [in Jones] that '[t] he commit-
ted acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his san-
ity or is no longer dangerous.' ,227 In other words, the Foucha
plurality held, "the acquittee may be held as long as he is both
mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer," 228 just like a person
committed in a civil proceeding. Because Louisiana conceded
that Foucha was no longer mentally ill, the plurality concluded,
"the basis for holding Foucha in a psychiatric facility as an
insanity acquittee has disappeared, and [Louisiana] is no longer
entitled to hold him on that basis."2 1
Expanding on this conclusion, the plurality examined three
situations where the state may involuntarily confine a person in
either the criminal or civil context.2 0 First, the plurality noted, a
person may be convicted of a crime and imprisoned for the pur-
poses of deterrence and retribution. Because Foucha was not
convicted, he may not be punished. Accordingly, his commit-
ment, the plurality points out, is not justifiable as punishment.
Second, the plurality finds, a state may civilly confine a person "if
it shows 'by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is
mentally ill and dangerous.' "23' Because Louisiana did not con-
tend Foucha was mentally ill, commitment based on mental ill-
ness was unavailable. 232 Finally, the plurality held that the Court
had "held that in certain narrow circumstances persons who pose
a danger to others or to the community may be subject to limited
confinement and it is on these cases, particularly United States v.
Salerno,2 a3 that [Louisiana] relies [on] in this case."2 4 Louisi-
227. Id. at 77 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 368). But see supra note 222.
228. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77.
229. Id. at 78.
230. Id. at 80-83.
231. Id. at 80 (quotingJones, 463 U.S. at 362). But see supra notes 216 and
222.
232. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
233. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
234. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
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ana's argument, however, failed to persuade the plurality.
Although the criminal trial that results in an insanity acquittal
and the subsequent civil hearings provide comprehensive proce-
dural protection, the plurality decided that the indefinite com-
mitment of an insanity acquittee was too extensive in comparison
with the narrowly focused purpose and strictly limited duration
of the pre-trial detention authorized by Salerno.2 "5 Thus, the plu-
rality concluded that Louisiana's statutory scheme that permitted
the continued confinement of sane, but dangerous, insanity
acquittees violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.23 6
A plurality of the Court, however, does not carry the day.
WhetherJustice O'Connor's concurrence coincided with the plu-
rality's perspective on the holding in Jones is a key concern in
determining the effect of Foucha on the constitutional standards
for all involuntary civil commitment. AlthoughJustice O'Connor
agreed with the plurality's determination that Louisiana may not
continue to confine Foucha despite his lack of mental illness, she
did not adopt the per se rule that the plurality advocated, at least
with regard to insanity acquittees.23 7 Justice O'Connor wrote, "I
do not understand the Court to hold that Louisiana may never
confine dangerous insanity acquittees after they regain mental
health.""'8 For Justice O'Connor, the problem with Louisiana's
statutory scheme was not its substance, but its breadth. She
wrote:
This case does not require us to pass judgment on more
narrowly drawn laws that provide for the detention of
insanity acquittees, or on statutes that provide for punish-
ment of persons who commit crimes while mentally ill....
It might . . . be permissible for Louisiana to confine an
insanity acquittee who has regained his sanity if, unlike the
situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention
235. Id. at 81.
236. Id. at 83. The plurality also stated that Louisiana's statutory scheme
discriminated against Foucha and other insanity acquittees in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not
provide for similar treatment of other classes of persons who have committed
criminal acts and who cannot later prove that they would not be dangerous. Id.
at 84-85.
237. More importantly for the purposes of evaluating Minnesota's statute,
Justice O'Connor did not object to the plurality's assertion that an individual
who is committed pursuant to a civil proceeding, as opposed to an insanity
acquittal, must be released when he regains his sanity.
238. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87 (emphasis added).
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were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns
related to the acquittee's continuing dangerousness. 23 9
Like the dissenters, Justice O'Connor focused on the fact
that the insanity acquittee is necessarily found beyond a reason-
able doubt to have committed a criminal act that, as noted in
Jones, is "concrete evidence" of dangerousness. 2 ° "[T] his finding
of criminal conduct," Justice O'Connor argued, "sets them apart
from ordinary citizens."241 She then notes: "By contrast, '[t]he
only certain thing that can be said about the present state of
knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science
has not reached finality ofjudgment. ,',242 Due to this uncer-
tainty, Justice O'Connor urged courts to pay " 'particular defer-
ence to reasonable legislative judgments' about the relationship
between dangerous behavior and mental illness. "243 Although
Justice O'Connor indicated, "I think it clear that acquittees could
not be confined as mental patients absent some medical justifica-
tion for doing so; in such a case the necessary connection
between the nature and purposes of confinement would be
absent,''2 4 she did not equate "medical justification" with a find-
ing of insanity. In fact, she explicitly states that Foucha places no
new restrictions on the states' freedom to determine whether
and to what extent mental illness should excuse criminal behav-
ior.24 5 In brief, Foucha does not require that the insanity defense
be made available nor does it undermine the validity of laws pro-
viding for prison terms after verdicts of "guilty, but mentallyi11.",24
Thus, although Justice O'Connor is less than clear on what
exactly she believes Foucha holds, she indicates that she believes
that situations may exist where the state may continue to confine
dangerous insanity acquittees, even after they regain their san-
ity.2 47 Accordingly, the bald assertion that the Due Process
Clause requires that the states release dangerous insanity acquit-
tees once they regain their sanity remains supported only by a
plurality of the Court, two members of which no longer sit.
239. Id. at 87-88.
240. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983).
241. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87.
242. Id. (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 365 n.13 (quoting Greenwood v.
United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956))).
243. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 87 (quotingJones, 463 U.S. at 365 n.13).
244. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 88-89. Justice O'Connor also noted that she felt it was
unnecessary to reach equal protection issues on the facts of the appeal. Id. at
88.
247. Id. at 87.
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B. Foucha Applied to Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute
Some interpret Foucha as invalidating Minnesota's Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Statute on constitutional grounds.248
What effect does Foucha, a case dealing with the release of those
who were civilly committed pursuant to a criminal insanity
acquittal, not a civil proceeding, have on Minnesota's statute?
After the result, if not the holding, of Foucha, the Due Process
Clause requires states to release those committed pursuant to a
civil proceeding, as opposed to those committed as insanity
acquittees, whenever they either regain their sanity or are no
longer dangerous. 249 While this proposition was not squarely
presented, the plurality seems to assume that this principle gov-
erns the release of a person committed in a civil proceeding. 25 °
Justice O'Connor and the dissenters emphasized the fact that an
insanity acquittee has been found guilty of criminal conduct
beyond a reasonable doubt. For Justice O'Connor and the dis-
senters, this determination distinguishes an insanity acquittee
from a person committed in a civil proceeding.251 Because this
determination is not made in a civil proceeding, Justice
O'Connor and the dissenters also seem to assume that a showing
of either sanity or safety requires the release of a person commit-
ted in a civil proceeding. Thus, the Court was divided only on
the question of whether the standard should be the same for
those committed as insanity acquittees. Because of Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion, the question whether a state
may constitutionally keep a dangerous, but sane insanity acquit-
tee civilly committed, and under what conditions, is still an open
248. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 145-47.
249. See supra note 222.
250. The plurality states, "Jones established that insanity acquittees may be
treated differendy in some respects from those persons subject to civil
commitment, but Foucha, who is not now thought to be insane, can no longer
be so classified." Foucha, 504 U.S. at 85. Implicit in this statement is the
assertion that only those persons, committed in a civil proceeding, who are still
insane are subject to continued civil commitment. This implicit assertion
coupled with the requirement of O'Connor v. Donaldson that a person
committed in a civil proceeding must remain dangerous to justify continued
civil commitment, demonstrate the plurality's underlying assumption.
251. "Although insanity acquittees may not be incarcerated as criminals
or penalized for asserting the insanity defense, this finding of criminal conduct
sets them apart from ordinary citizens." Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citations omitted). "This is a criminal case." Id. at 90 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
"While a state may renounce a punitive interest by offering an insanity defense,
it does not follow that, once the acquittee's sanity is 'restored,' the State is
required to ignore his criminal act. . ." Id. at 110 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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question. For the purposes of evaluating the constitutionality of
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, however,
the unresolved questions regarding insanity acquittees and how
they might be distinguished from other civil committees is not
critical. Nevertheless, Foucha is valuable because it clarified the
standard of release for those committed pursuant to a civil pro-
ceeding and because it provided dicta that may be helpful if
applied by analogy.
While the standard that Foucha clarified may affect the stat-
ute's constitutionality, it does not generally invalidate the statute.
The potential adverse effect of Foucha on the statute is minimal,
and it is easily remedied.
1. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides
that no state shall deny any person "equal protection of the
laws." 52 Accordingly, the Equal Protection Clause restricts the
manner in which laws classify persons. Supreme Court equal
protection analysis sets out a three-tier model of review. The
three tiers of review are rational basis - the lowest level of
review, strict scrutiny - the highest level of review, and middle-
tier review. If a law impinges upon a suspect class25 or a "funda-
mental" right,2" then the law is subject to strict scrutiny. Such a
law must be "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling state
interest."255 If a suspect class or fundamental right is not at
stake, the law need only be rationally related to a legitimate state
interest to be constitutional. 56 Finally, some rights and classes
are subject to middle-tier review. Under such review, the law
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
253. Race, alienage, and nationality are the suspect classes recognized by
the Supreme Court. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Whether a classification is
inherently suspect is determined by considering whether the status is 1) an
immutable one; 2) often targeted by stereotypical legislation not related to
individual responsibility; 3) characterized by a history of repressive legislation;
and 4) discrete and insular. See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
254. The catalog of "fundamental" rights includes rights explicitly
guaranteed by the constitution such as the right of free speech, but has also
been judicially expanded to include, for example, rights such as the right to
vote, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 628-29 (1969); to
practice contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86, 486-89
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); to travel in interstate commerce, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31, 634 (1969); and to marry, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).
255. See, e.g., Bakke v. Board of Regents, 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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need only have a "substantial relationship" to an "important"
state interest to be constitutional. 257
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute creates
a discernible class of people: persons who possess a "sexual psy-
chopathic personality" and "sexually dangerous persons." While
this class is hardly suspect, whether an identifiable fundamental
right is at stake is not easily determined. Individuals committed
pursuant to Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute
are, of course, deprived of their liberty. Liberty alone, however,
cannot be asserted as fundamental in the abstract without refer-
ence to another right.258 Freedom to vote, for example, is a fun-
damental right triggering strict scrutiny, 59 freedom in the
abstract is not. The plurality in Foucha found, however, that
"freedom from bodily restraint " 26° is at the core of liberty. The
plurality cites Youngberg v. Romeop6' to support its finding. Justice
Thomas in dissent in Foucha, on the other hand, points out that
[w]hat 'freedom from bodily restraint' meant in
[Youngberg] is completely different from what the Court
uses the phrase to mean [in Foucha]. Youngberg involved
the substantive due process rights of an institutionalized,
mentally retarded patient who had been restrained by
shackles placed on his arms for portions of each day. What
the Court meant by 'freedom from bodily restraint,' then,
was quite literally freedom not to be strapped to a bed.
257. Middle-tier review is applied to laws involving classes considered less
significant than those triggering strict scrutiny, but more significant than those
requiring only a rational basis. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976)
(applying middle-tier review to a regulation based on gender) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977) (applying middle-
tier review to a regulation based on illegitimacy).
258. In his dissent in Foucha, Justice Thomas argues:
A liberty interest per se is not the same thing as a fundamental right.
Whatever the exact scope of the fundamental right to 'freedom from
bodily restraint' recognized by our cases, it certainly cannot be
defined at the exceedingly great level of generality the Court suggests
today. There is simply no basis in our society's history or in the
precedents of this Court to support the existence of a sweeping,
general fundamental right to 'freedom from bodily restraint'
applicable to all persons in all contexts. If convicted prisoners could
claim such a right, for example, we would subject all prison sentences
to strict scrutiny. This we have consistently refused to do. See, e.g.,
Chapman v. United States, 111 S.Ct. 1919 (1991). Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 117-18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
259. Kramer v. Union Frei School District, 395 U.S. 621, 628-29 (1969).
260. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316
(1982)).
261. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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That case in no way established the broad 'freedom from
bodily restraint' - apparently meaning freedom from all
involuntary confinement - that the Court discusses
today.2
62
The plurality in Foucha also states that because "[f] reedom from
physical restraint [is] a fundamental right" the State must have "a
particularly convincing reason" for discriminatory confine-
ment.2 63 While the plurality used "fundamental" to refer to the
right not to be involuntarily confined, it did not employ strict
scrutiny and require a "compelling state interest" to which the
statute had to be "narrowly tailored." Accordingly, the right was
not treated as truly "fundamental." Such an approach is not sur-
prising. The Court apparently wanted to emphasize the impor-
tance of individual liberty to roam free, as it were. If such a right
had been recognized as truly fundamental, every statute provid-
ing for civil or criminal confinement would give rise to an equal
protection claim, and would require that the State demonstrate
the statute is "narrowly tailored" to advance a "compelling state
interest."2" Such an approach is not what the plurality
embraced.
While some assert that involuntary civil commitment is, in
211~fact, subject to strict scrutiny, it is more likely that it is subject
to middle-tier or reasonable basis review. Nevertheless, Minne-
sota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute passes even strict
scrutiny because compelling state interests exist to which it is nar-
rowly tailored. These interests are the same interests that sup-
port the hospitalization of those who are mentally ill and
dangerous: the Government's interest in treating and supervising
those who are suffering from a mental, emotional or psychologi-
cal disorder such that they pose a danger to themselves or others.
In Blodgett, the Minnesota Supreme Court held, "the compelling
government interest [that justifies the commitment] is the pro-
tection of members of the public from persons who have an
uncontrollable impulse to sexually assault."26 6 In addition, the
statute is, in fact, narrowly tailored to this interest in public
safety: the statutory categories describe with specificity a particu-
lar kind of dangerous individual. The limiting factors intro-
duced in Pearson and now specifically incorporated into the
262. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 118 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
263. Id. at 86.
264. See supra note 258.
265. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 142.
266. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
146 (1994).
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statute by the recent amendments, ensure that the statute is not
too vague or too broad.
In Blodgett, Blodgett argued that subjecting those who
repeatedly commit sexually violent crimes to indefinite civil com-
mitment, without subjecting other types of violent recidivist
criminals such as arsonists or serial killers to similar treatment,
violated equal protection. 26 ' The objection, however, is invalid.
As the Supreme Court observed in Pearson,
[w]hether the legislature could have gone farther is not
the question. The class [the legislature] did select is identi-
fied by the state court in terms which clearly show that the
persons within that class constitute a dangerous element in
the community which the legislature in its discretion could
put under appropriate control. As we have often said, the
legislature is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it may
confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be the clearest.268
In sum, under any of the three tiers of review, Minnesota's
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
2. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution provides,
in relevant part, that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " As the
federal judiciary developed the jurisprudence of due process
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it created a body
of substantive rights out of the procedural rights implicit in the
phrase "due process of law." Thus, two notions of due process
emerged: procedural due process and substantive due process.
One author observes:
On its face, the Due Process clause gives the illusion of
being concerned only with matters of procedure - with
issues such as notice, a right to be heard, and the like. But
the clause necessarily is broader, because it is bound up
with the concept of 'life, liberty or property' that the 'pro-
cess' is invoked to protect. Hence the concept of 'substan-
tive' due process: the clause may be used to protect against
arbitrary state deprivations of life, liberty or property of
various kinds, even if they do not pose issues that we nor-
267. Id. at 917.
268. 309 U.S. 270, 274-75.
269. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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mally would think of as procedural. According to this
notion, a legislative enactment regulating the conduct of
an individual . . . may be invalid if it impairs interests in
life, liberty or property, even if the procedure by which it is
enacted is, strictly speaking, not objectionable.2 70
Thus, in many ways substantive due process mirrors equal protec-
tion analysis which also necessitates an inquiry into the infringe-
ment of "fundamental" rights.
As the Supreme Court stated in Addington, "civil commit-
ment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of lib-
erty that requires due process protection. "271 Due process here
involves the application of certain substantive standards and pro-
vision of certain procedural protection at two critical stages in a
civil commitment proceeding: when the individual is committed
and when the individual seeks release. In brief, the civil commit-
ment procedure must be constitutional on the way in and on the
way out.
a. The Constitutional Standards for Initial Commitment
The Supreme Court in Foucha held Louisiana's commitment
procedure violated the Due Process Clause because it did not
qualify as one of the three situations where the Court - plurality
and concurrence - asserted the state may involuntarily confine
a person in either the criminal or civil system.2 72 The first cate-
gory noted by the Court in Foucha is criminal confinement. Obvi-
ously, a person committed because he possesses a SPP or is a SDP
has not necessarily been convicted of a crime and is not impris-
oned for the purposes of deterrence and retribution. Second,
the Foucha Court noted that "in certain narrow circumstances
persons who pose a danger to others or to the community may be
subject to limited confinement. "273 Despite the due process pro-
vided by a criminal trial resulting in an insanity acquittal and the
subsequent civil hearings provided by Louisiana's commitment
scheme, the plurality in Foucha thought the indefinite commit-
ment of an insanity acquittee was too extensive.274 In light of the
plurality's holding, and Justice O'Connor's focus in her concur-
ring opinion on the fact that an insanity acquittee is found guilty
270. DAVID CRUMP ET. AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
331-32 (2d ed. 1993).
271. 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967);
Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967)).
272. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-83 (1992) (White, J., plurality).
273. Id. at 80.
274. Id. at 82-83.
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of criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt, it is unlikely that
Minnesota's commitment scheme can be justified as belonging
to this category of "narrow circumstances." Accordingly, Minne-
sota's commitment scheme must be justified, if at all, only under
the third category - the civil commitment of those who are
mentally ill and dangerous.275
In Foucha, whether the commitment procedure could bejus-
tified under this category was open and shut because Louisiana
did not contend Foucha was mentally ill. 2 76 The Court in Foucha
did not directly address the constitutional standards for commit-
ment or release for those committed pursuant to a civil proceed-
ing. The Court definitely did not attempt to define "mental
illness." Rather, the Court addressed the standard for the release
of insanity acquittees. On the other hand, Professor Erlinder
cites Foucha as standing for the proposition that "not all mental
conditions may be classified as mental illness for the purpose of
civil commitment."277 Professor Erlinder first concludes that
[e]ven though, Foucha did suffer from a mental condition,
i.e., he had been diagnosed as suffering from an anti-social
personality, the Court [in Foucha] noted that an anti-social
personality was not synonymous with mental illness as
defined by the medical community.278
On the contrary, the Foucha plurality was merely recounting
the opinion of the individual Louisiana doctor who examined
Foucha when it commented that an anti-social personality was "a
condition that is not a mental disease and that is untreatable."279
Because Louisiana failed to claim Foucha was mentally ill,
whether an anti-social personality is a mental illness was not an
issue before the Court; nor was the issue decided. Foucha's anti-
social personality was relied on by Louisiana only as evidence of
"dangerousness," not as evidence of "mental illness." The con-
clusion of a doctor in Louisiana regarding Foucha's condition
has little bearing on the constitutionality of Minnesota's statute.
That an anti-social personality is not a "mental illness" was merely
assumed in Foucha because Louisiana conceded as much. Even
275. This analysis assumes that the three categories enumerated in Foucha
were meant to be exhaustive. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in In re
Blodgett, the approval of Minnesota's statute in Pearson may be considered either
a sub-set of Foucha's mentally ill and dangerous category or an additional
category. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146
(1994).
276. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 76 n.4, 78, 80.
277. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 141.
278. Id.
279. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 75.
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more important, while a person who possesses a SPP or is a SDP
may suffer from an anti-social personality, the two conditions are
not synonymous and merely suffering from an anti-social person-
ality does not satisfy the criteria of Minnesota's statute. Finally,
the Supreme Court has not asserted authority to decide what
constitutes a "mental illness." According to the Supreme Court,
the legal definition of insanity, at least in the criminal context, is
completely left to the states. 280 Just as the states possess the right
to define "insanity" for legal purposes in the criminal arena, so
the states ought to possess the right to define "mental illness" for
legal purposes in the civil arena. "Mental illness," like "insanity,"
is, above all else, a legal term to be defined in light of purpose,
not the essential character of things.
Second, Professor Erlinder concludes that
the Court's references to mental illness in Jones, set forth a
necessary condition for involuntary civil commitment and
should not be understood to mean that any mental condi-
tion the legislature chooses may be the basis of involuntary
confinement. Only mental illness, recognized by the medi-
cal community, may be the basis for involuntary
confinement.281
Here, too, the Professor is misguided. Surely requiring "mental
illness" for constitutional purposes as a necessary condition for
initial commitment or release from commitment is not the same
as defining the concept itself or determining who may legiti-
mately define it for constitutional purposes. In any event, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence is the key to discerning the meaning of
Foucha, more than the plurality's opinion. Although speaking in
the context of the release of insanity acquittees rather than the
initial commitment of persons in a civil proceeding, Justice
O'Connor stated, "I think it clear that acquittees could not be
confined as mental patients absent some medical justification for
doing so; in such a case the necessary connection between the
280. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 797-99 (1952) (refusing to,
under the Constitution, forbid the states from placing on the defendant the
burden of proving the defense of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977) (refusing to, under the
Constitution, forbid the states from placing on the defendant the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence the affirmative defense of acting
under extreme emotional distress, in order to reduce the crime of murder to
manslaughter in the first degree); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968)
(refusing to adopt a Constitutional insanity test) (Marshall, J., plurality
opinion). See also idi at 545 (finding that the Constitution does not impose on
the States any particular test of criminal responsibility) (Black, J., concurring).
281. Erlinder, supra note 10, at 141-42.
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nature and purposes of confinement would be absent."282 "Med-
ical justification," however, does not mean that "mentally ill"
must correspond to a "medical condition" recognized by doctors,
rather than constitute a purposeful legal definition drafted by a
state legislature based on medical knowledge. On the contrary,
Justice O'Connor argues only that the justification for commit-
ment should be medically related or based, as opposed to mor-
ally or politically based. This interpretation of her statement is
amply supported by her emphasis of the need for a connection
to legal "purpose." Justice O'Connor argues for deference to leg-
islatures, not psychiatrists. 283 Defining "mentally ill" or "insanity"
with regard to culpability and commitment is a purposeful legal
task best left primarily to the state courts or legislatures. While
"mental illness" is a necessary condition for involuntary civil com-
mitment under the Constitution, what constitutes "mental ill-
ness," or who may define it, was hardly determined in Foucha.
Accordingly, Foucha does not prevent Minnesota from deter-
mining that a person who possesses a SPP or is a SDP is "mentally
ill." Blodgett was decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
1994, two years after Foucha. In Blodgett, the court stated that the
Supreme Court's approval of Minnesota's statute in Pearson and
the failure to overrule Pearson in Foucha demonstrated that Min-
nesota's statute may be considered "a sub-set of Foucha's second
category (mentally ill and dangerous)."284
In fact, the Minnesota Legislature did exactly what the Min-
nesota Supreme Court said it did; the Sexual Psychopathic Per-
sonality Statute provides for the civil commitment of a certain
class of individuals who are "mentally ill" and "dangerous." The
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute draws on the volitional
definition of insanity - having an "irresistible impulse" - to
define a class of people who lack control over their violent sexual
impulses. 285 As the Minnesota Supreme Court pointed out in
Blodgett, "whatever the explanation or label, the 'psychopathic
personality' is an identifiable and documentable violent and sex-
ually deviant condition or disorder."286 Because of this form of
volitional "mental illness" and the resulting danger to the public,
Minnesota commits these individuals to a secured hospital in
order that they may be treated, supervised, and prevented from
continuing to harm others. "As long as civil commitment is
282. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
283. Id. at 87.
284. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 914 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
146 (1994).
285. Id.
286. Id.
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programmed to provide treatment and periodic review, due pro-
cess is provided." 2 7 Because the states possess the constitutional
power to define "mental illness" in both criminal and civil con-
texts, and because the dangerousness of these individuals can be
inferred from a pattern of harmful conduct, the commitment
procedure ought to be held valid under Foucha as the civil com-
mitment of people who are mentally ill and dangerous.
b. The Constitutional Standards for Release
After Foucha, Minnesota's standards'and procedure for ini-
tial commitment pursuant to the Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute remain constitutional, but the standards and procedure
for release may well be invalid.
The statutory sections that specifically refer to a person who
possesses a SPP or is a SDP do not address the standards for
release, but the sections incorporate the standards applied to
those persons committed as mentally ill and dangerous under
the chapter generally.28 Accordingly, a person committed
under the statute may not be discharged
unless it appears to the satisfaction of the commissioner,
after a hearing and a favorable recommendation by a
majority of the special review board, that the patient is
capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open soci-
ety, is no longer dangerous to the public, and is no longer
in need of inpatient treatment and supervision. 28 9
In other words, a showing of either sanity or safety is not sufficient;
both must be shown in order to be released.
The plurality in Foucha argued for a per se rule that either
sanity or safety requires the release of a civilly committed insanity
acquittee.290 Justice O'Connor, however, rejected the per se rule,
but concurred in the result due to the breadth of the statute at
issue. Although Justice O'Connor stated, "I do not understand
the Court to hold that Louisiana may never confine dangerous
insanity acquittees after they regain mental health," "' she
seemed to base her opinion on the fact that insanity acquittees,
unlike those committed pursuant to a civil proceeding, are found
guilty of criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Although
not directly at issue in the appeal, in Foucha, the plurality, con-
287. Id. at 916.
288. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 17.
289. Id. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (emphasis added).
290. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 76 n.4, 77, 85-86 (1992) (White,J,
plurality opinion).
291. Id. at 87.
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currence, and dissents all assume that a showing of either sanity
or safety requires the release of a person committed in a civil
proceeding.292
On the assumption that this alternative (sane or safe) is
indeed the law after Foucha,293 Minnesota's standard for the
release of all mentally ill and dangerous persons, including any-
one who possesses a SPP or is a SDP may violate the Due Process
Clause.94 If it exists, the violation is constitutionally significant,
but unimportant in terms of the statute's substance. The consti-
tutional defect can be easily remedied by adding an "and" and
changing the "and" already present to an "or" so that the section
would require that the person committed not be discharged
unless it appears to the satisfaction of the commissioner,
after a hearing and a favorable recommendation by a
majority of the special review board, that the patient is
capable of making an acceptable adjustment to open soci-
ety and is no longer dangerous to the public or is no longer
in need of inpatient treatment and supervision.29 5
The goals of the Minnesota Sexual Psychopathic Personality Stat-
ute remain sound and the bulk of the statute, if not all of it,
remains constitutional, even after Foucha. If needed, a minor
adjustment in the Civil Commitment Act into which the original
sections were incorporated will restore the statute's integrity.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the recent repeal and re-enactment with amend-
ments did not jeopardize the constitutionality of Minnesota's
Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute, the changes deserve dis-
cussion in light of their effect on its constitutionality and overall
clarity. The legislature made both positive and negative changes.
Prior to its repeal and re-enactment with amendments, Min-
nesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act consisted of three
sections in the chapter of general probate provisions. The first
section defined the term "psychopathic personality" as a person
292. See supra notes 250 and 251 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 222.
294. The court in Blodgett, unfortunately, blends the notions of sanity and
safety into the idea of remission generally when it states: "In Foucha the
confinement was for insanity and, when the insanity was shown to be in
remission, the United States Supreme Court said Foucha had to be released.
Here if there is a remission of Blodgett's sexual disorder, if his deviant sexual
behavior is brought under control, he, too, is entitled to release." In re
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 916 (Minn.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
295. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.18, subd. 15 (changes emphasized).
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whose emotional instability, impulsiveness, or lack of judgment
renders that person irresponsible in sexual matters and thereby
dangerous to others. 96 The second section provided some com-
mitment procedures and incorporated the non-conflicting provi-
sions relating to the commitment of persons mentally ill and
dangerous contained in the Minnesota Civil Commitment Act -
Chapter 253B.29 7 The third section provided that possessing a
psychopathic personality does not constitute a defense to a
charge or crime, nor relieve any person from liability to be tried
upon a criminal charge. The Minnesota Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute now exists as four subdivisions within the Civil
Commitment Act - Chapter 253B.298
The term "psychopathic personality" was amended to read
"sexual psychopathic personality," but the definition itself
remained almost identical. The only change was the long-over-
due incorporation of the three-part test formulated in Pearson.29
After Pearson, in order to demonstrate that someone possesses a
psychopathic personality, the state has to show (1) habitual mis-
conduct in sexual matters, (2) an utter lack of power to control
sexual impulses, and (3) a likelihood that this lack of control will
result in injury to others. The recent amendments include these
judicially-created requirements in the definition of a person who
possesses a SPP.3°° The express inclusion of the Pearson three-
part test increases the statute's clarity and reduces the risk of its
misapplication.
The addition of an another category - "sexually dangerous
persons" - was another significant change in the statutory
scheme. Sexually dangerous persons are an additional category
of persons who may be involuntarily civilly committed under the
statute. A SDP is defined as a person who "(1) has engaged in a
course of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a;
(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disor-
der or dysfunction; and (3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts
of harmful sexual conduct as defined in subdivision 7a.""' l
The term "harmful sexual conduct" is defined as "sexual
conduct that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical
or emotional harm to another."3" 2 In addition, a rebuttable pre-
sumption is created that certain enumerated criminal acts consti-
296. Id. § 526.09.
297. Id. § 526.10.
298. Id. § 253B.02, subds. 7a, 17, 18a and 18b.
299. 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
300. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a.
301. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a).
302. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(a).
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tute "harmful sexual conduct."3°3 The inclusion and definition
of this term clarifies the statute by making the required finding
of dangerousness more focused and specific. In fact, the term
"harmful sexual conduct" is superior to the term "misconduct in
sexual matters" that is used in the definition of a person who
possesses a SPP. "Harmful sexual conduct" as defined is clearer
and rebuts the challenge that the statute may be construed to
apply to merely idiosyncratic behavior. The definition of "harm-
ful sexual conduct" also refutes the unfounded claims that the
harm caused by a person who possesses a SPP must be physical,
rather than merely emotional. 3 4
A person who is a SDP is basically equivalent to a person who
possesses a SPP; the three elements that the state must prove in
order to establish that a person is a SDP correspond to the Pear-
son three-part test contained in the definition of a person who
possesses a SPP. The only significant difference is that the state
does not have to prove that the person has an inability to control
their sexual impulses305 - the second factor in the three-part
Pearson test. Instead, the state need establish only that the person
has "manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder
or dysfunction. "306 While the addition of this second category of
persons to whom the statute applies was beneficial in that it
resulted in the creation of the term "harmful sexual conduct"
and its definition, the addition of the second category was, over-
all, a mistake.
303. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 7a(b). See supra note 12.
304. Before the statute was amended to create a rebuttable presumption
that the commission of certain crimes - many of which are not necessarily
violent - creates a substantial likelihood that the victim suffered serious
physical or emotional harm, the Supreme Court of Minnesota decided In the
Matter of Rickmeyer, 519 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994). Peter Rickmeyer, a
pedophile, habitually had sexual contact with young boys. Primarily, Rickmeyer
fondled and spanked young boys at a local playground. Reversing the trial
court's decision to commit Rickmeyer, the Minnesota Supreme Court found:
There may be instances where a pedophile's pattern of sexual
misconduct is of such an egregious nature that there is a substantial
likelihood of serious physical or mental harm being inflicted on the
victims such as to meet the requirements for commitment as a
psychopathic personality. In this case, however, the record does not
support the trial court's findings that [Rickmeyer] has inflicted or is
likely to inflict serious physical or mental harm on his victims.
[Rickmeyer's] unauthorized sexual "touchings" and "spankings," while
repellent, do not constitute the kind of injury, pain, "or other evil"
that is contemplated by the . . . statute.
Id- at 190. The holding of this case was set aside by the new statutory language.
305. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(b).
306. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18b(a) (2).
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The addition seems to have been an effort to get around the
requirement that a person who possesses a SPP must have an
"utterlack of power to control his sexual impulses." ' 7 "Utter" is a
strong word. It suggests that a person who possesses a SPP must
be completely out of control. Yet, case law demonstrates "utter"
is not interpreted to require a total and complete lack of con-
trol.3 0 8 For example, a person who possesses a SPP may show a
307. Id. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (emphasis added).
308. See, e.g., In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994),
review denied (Oct. 27, 1994). Before being committed under the Sexual
Psychopathic Personality statute, Barry Bieganowski had a history of sexual
assaults on adult females as well as children of both sexes. When he was 20
years old, he violently raped his sister-in-law because his wife was eight and a
half months pregnant and, as he stated, "[it] felt right at the time." Id. at 526.
He pled guilty, was sentenced to prison and paroled after two years. He then
served 120 days for a parole violation. For the next two years after his release,
he engaged in multiple acts of oral sex with his seven-year-old son and six-year-
old stepdaughter, and in anal intercourse on at least one occasion with his
seven-year-old son. Bieganowski also took explicit photographs of this sexual
activity. He explained that a friend had told him about intercourse with young
children and so he "experimented" with his own children. Id At Bieganowski's
commitment hearing, a psychiatrist, Dr. Farnsworth, testified that while
Bieganowski's sexual behavior was habitual he felt it might not demonstrate an
'utter" lack- of power to control sexual impulses. Id. at 527. Dr. Farnsworth
testified that the "grooming" behavior exhibited by pedophiles like Bieganowski
- developing a relationship with victims before becoming sexually involved
with them - involves some planning and foresight. This grooming, Dr.
Farnsworth felt, was contradictory to an utter lack of control. Id. Dr.
Farnsworth defined "utter lack of control" as an "impulse control problem 'in
which there is an ability to stop one's behavior despite being in an area of risk
of being apprehended or caught.' " Id. Another psychiatrist who testified at
Bieganowski's hearing, Dr. Satterfield, however, found that Bieganowski did
demonstrate an utter lack of power to control his sexual impulses "even though
he is not out of control every second of the day." Id Dr. Satterfield believed
the "utter" standard was met because Bieganowski had "absolutely no
boundaries around his sexual behavior and impulses, and is extremely likely to
have no control [over what] 'triggers' " his behavior. Id. A third psychiatrist,
Dr. Malecha, testified that the statutory criteria for commitment were met.
After listening to this testimony, in addition to other evidence, the trial court
agreed with Dr. Satterfield and Dr. Malecha and found Bieganowski met the
standards for commitment. Id. at 528. The Court of Appeals of Minnesota
observed:
Although the "grooming" process requires time, thus eliminating any
"suddenness" regarding the sexual activity, the habitual nature of
[Bieganowski's] predatory sexual conduct indicates an inability to stop
the "grooming" behavior. The trial court reasoned that
[Bieganowski's] failure to remove himself from situations that provide
the opportunity for similar offenses, and his failure to avoid precursors
that trigger his impulsive behavior... demonstrate his lack of control.
His impulsiveness is also evidenced by the established pattern of
escape when [Bieganowski] is faced with the consequences of his own
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degree of control over his impulses by waiting for the most
opportune moment to attack. Interpreting "utter" to mean
something less than complete lack of control at any time or
under any circumstances is appropriate. Arguing by analogy,
simply because a kleptomaniac is able to resist the temptation to
steal when a security guard is watching, does not mean he could
not be accurately described as having an "utter lack of power to
control" his thievery. Simply because an alcoholic is able to
refuse a drink on one occasion, does not mean he could not
appropriately be described as having an "utter lack of power to
control" his drinking."0 9 Similarly, the fact that a sexual predator
postpones an attack for fear of being captured or detected, or
even out of an atypical experience of guilt, does not mean he
does not exhibit an "utter lack of power to control" his sexual
impulses. Repeatedly lacking control over a period of time
should determine whether an person has an "utter lack of power
to control" his sexual impulses, not the presence or absence of
control in any one instance.
Nevertheless, the addition of the second category is not a
constitutionally fatal change. The ability to commit a person in
the absence of a judicial determination of some degree of lack of
control, however, works against the assertion that the classifica-
tion is analogous to having an irresistible impulse, that is, an
extension of one traditional form of legal concept of insanity.
The lack of control that accompanies the emotional, personality,
or mental disorders of a person who possesses a SPP supports the
claim that these disorders are mental illnesses. Dispensing with
the lack of control requirement with regard to a person commit-
ted as a SDP does not preclude a finding of "mental illness," but
failure to comply with probation terms or other restrictions. Thus ....
[his] conduct manifests the "utter lack of power to control"
contemplated in Pearson.
Id at 530. The Court of Appeals affirmed the commitment. Id. at 532. Compare
In the Matter of Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d 446, 450 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994),
review denied (Oct. 27, 1994) (finding that planning sexual overtures to children
tends to preclude a finding an "utter lack of power to control sexual impulses").
See also In re Lineham, 518 N.W.2d 609, 613-14 (Minn. 1994) (stating that psy-
chiatric testimony must conform to the Pearson test and providing six factors for
the trial courts to consider in predicting dangerousness to the public).
309. See generally Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Marshall, J.,
plurality opinion). In Powel, five Justices acknowledged that a chronic
alcoholic - a status - could most likely not be punished for his drinking, but
refused to overturn conviction for public intoxication on Eighth Amendment
grounds because "appellant was convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic,
but for being in public while drunk on a particular occasion." Id. at 532. But see
HERBERT FINGARE-rE, HEAry DRINKING: THE MYrH OF ALCOHOLISM AS A DISEASE
(1988).
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any weakening of the constitutional basis for commitment was ill-
advised.
The tension between the extreme requirement of an "utter
lack of power to control" and the overly indulgent elimination of
any necessity to prove lack of control might be best remedied by
replacing both terms with a single class of persons subject to the
statute. The definitions of a person who possesses a SPP and a
person who is a SDP could be combined and the second Pearson
requirement would become proving that the person to be com-
mitted has "irresistible impulses to engage in harmful sexual con-
duct" rather than an "utter" lack of power to control his sexual
impulses.Al0 Even though persons committed under the new
standard might still possess the same degree of control as those
committed under the old standard, the phrase "irresistible
impulses" is more precise in light of how the statute is actually
being applied. In addition, because the same degree of lack of
control would be found as under the prior standard, the statute
would remain true to the Pearson test for constitutional purposes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law is not an end in itself, but a powerful instrument to
achieve the sound social goals of the community. As an instru-
ment, the law may be used in new ways to implement old pur-
poses in light of a new understanding of reality. Minnesota is
attempting to accomplish a new goal with its Sexual Psychopathic
Personality Statute. Minnesota recognizes that persons exist in
its community that do not fit into either of the traditional legal
categories - "mad" or "bad" - that make up the present para-
digm of culpability in the law. In order to treat these persons
and protect society from the danger they present, Minnesota
adapted its legal concept of "mental illness" to include the sort of
disorder displayed by these persons and expanded the basis for
its civil commitment. Instead of ignoring the problem of sex
offenders who are part "mad" and part "bad" or diverting the
criminal law from its fundamental requirement of moral blame-
worthiness, Minnesota developed a new legal compromise. Min-
nesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Statute acknowledges
these persons' unique lack of culpability and their unique dan-
ger to the community. Minnesota's effort to strike a balance
between competing goals and a complex reality that is not ade-
quately captured by two mutually exclusive categories - "mad"
and "bad" - is not only constitutional, but commendable.
310. See infra Appendix - Model Statute.
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APPENDIX
Although Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality Stat-
ute as it exists can serve as a model for other states wishing to
enact similar legislation, the following model statute incorpo-
rates this note's recommendations for improving the statute.
This model statute assumes the provisions will be incorporated
into an existing civil commitment act that provides constitutional
procedures for the commitment and release of persons who are
mentally ill and dangerous.1
Model Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act2
An Act to Authorize the Involuntary Civil Commitment and
Treatment of Sexual Psychopathic Personalities.'
[Insert appropriate enacting clause] .'
Section 1. [Short Title.]5 This Act shall be known and may
be cited as the "Sexual Psychopathic Personality Act of [insert
date]."
Section 2. [Definitions.] As used in this Act:
(a) "Sexual psychopathic personality" means the exist-
ence in any person of -
(1) conditions of emotional instability,
(2) impulsiveness of behavior,
(3) lack of customary standards of good judgment,
(4). failure to appreciate the consequences of personal
acts, or
(5) a combination of any of these conditions that
render that person irresponsible for any personal conduct with
respect to sexual matters, if the person evidences, by a habitual
course of harmful sexual conduct, that the person possesses irre-
sistible impulses to engage in harmful sexual conduct and is dan-
gerous to other persons because the person is likely to engage in
the future in acts of sexual conduct harmful to other persons.
1. See supra part IV.
2. This draft act attempts to follow the form established for uniform or
model acts in 75 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS 396-403 (1966) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
3. States impose various requirements on titles. Care should be exercised
to comply with them. See generally CARL H. MANSON, THE DRATING OF STATUTE
TrrLS, 10 IND. LJ. 155 (1934).
4. States impose various forms for enacting clauses. Care should be
exercised to comply with them; a mistake can be fatal. See, e.g., May v. Rice, 91
Ind. 546 (1883).
5. States sometimes prohibit using section headings. The brackets are a
warning to ascertain local law. HANDBOOK, supra note 2, at 399.
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(b) "Harmful sexual conduct" means sexual conduct
that creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emo-
tional harm to another person.
Section 3. [Permissible Inferences Based on Conduct.] If
any person engages in conduct in violation of [insert],' it gives
rise to a permissible inference that the person against whom the
conduct was directed suffered serious physical or emotional
harm.
Section 4. [Permissible Inferences Based on Motivation or
Pattern of Conduct Directed Toward a Goal.] If any person
engages in conduct in violation of [insert]7 where the conduct
was motivated by the person's sexual impulses or was part of a
pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual conduct as a goal, it
gives rise to a permissible inference of a substantial likelihood
that the person against whom the conduct was directed suffered
serious physical or emotional harm.
Section 5. [Applicability of Other Procedures for Commit-
ment.] Except as otherwise provided in this section, the provi-
sions of [insert]8 relating to persons mentally ill and dangerous
to the public apply to persons who are alleged or found to be
persons with a sexual psychopathic personality. Before commit-
ment proceedings are instituted, the facts supporting commit-
ment shall be first submitted to the [insert]9 who, if satisfied that
good cause exists, will prepare the petition. The [insert]' 0 may
request a prepetition screening report. The petition is to be exe-
cuted by a person having knowledge of the facts and filed with
the committing court of [insert]" in which the subject of the
petition has a settlement or is present. If the subject is in the
custody of [insert],"2 the petition may be filed in the [insert]'"
where the conviction for which the subject is incarcerated was
entered. Upon the filing of a petition alleging that the subject is
a person with a sexual psychopathic personality, the court shall
hear the petition according to the procedures otherwise set out
6. Cross references to the appropriate criminal provisions relating to
sexual conduct.
7. Cross references to the appropriate criminal provisions relating to
homicide, assault, robbery, kidnapping, false imprisonment, incest, tampering
with a witness, arson, burglary, threats, harassment and stalking.
8. Reference to the civil commitment chapter in which the Act is placed.
9. Insert appropriate prosecuting official.
10. Insert appropriate prosecuting official.
11. Insert appropriate governmental unit.
12. Insert appropriate correctional official.
13. Insert appropriate governmental unit.
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for the commitment of those who are mentally ill and dangerous
to the public.
Section 6. [Procedures for Transfer; Factors; Service of
Sentence.]
(a) [Transfer.] If a person committed under this Act is
later committed to the custody of [insert],14 the person may be
transferred from a hospital to another facility designated by the
[insert]15 as provided in section [insert] .16
(b) [Factors.] The factors to be considered by [insert]17
in determining whether a transfer is appropriate are -
(1) the person's unamenability to treatment,
(2) the person's unwillingness or failure to follow
treatment recommendations,
(3) the person's lack of progress in treatment at the
public or private hospital,
(4) the danger posed by the person to other patients
or staff at the public or private hospital, and
(5) the degree of security necessary to protect the
public.
(c) [Service of Sentence.] If a person is committed
under this Act after a commitment to the custody of [insert] ,"
the person shall first serve the sentence in a facility designated by
[insert]." After the person has served the sentence, the person
shall be transferred to a regional center designated by [insert].2°
Section 7. [Defense or Prohibition Against Trial Pre-
cluded.] The possession by any person of a sexual psychopathic
personality shall not constitute a defense to a charge of crime or
relieve such person from liability to be tried upon a criminal
charge.
14. Insert appropriate correctional official.
15. Insert appropriate correctional official.
16. Cross reference provisions covering the transfer of persons mentally
ill and dangerous to the public from hospitals to the appropriate correctional
facility.
17. Insert appropriate correctional official or civil commitment official or
both.
18. Insert appropriate correctional official.
19. Insert appropriate correctional official.
20. Insert the appropriate civil commitment official.

